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PREFACE
The purchase of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and 
Railroad Company (T.C.I. and R. Co.) by the U.S. Steel 
Corporation at the height of Panic of 1907 evoked critic­
ism by politicians which historians have subsequently re­
iterated. Some of this criticism was, and has been, 
levelled at President Theodore Roosevelt for not objecting 
to this merger as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. Elbert Gary, head of the U.S. Steel Corporation, had 
asked the President, prior to the purchase, if the govern­
ment would take legal action against his company because 
of this merger and was assured that it would not. A large 
part of the criticism has focused on the idea that the 
Morgan interests used the slump in security prices that 
accompanied the Panic to take over a valuable piece of 
property. Thus the U.E. Steel Corporation either created 
or intensified its monopolistic control of the American 
steel industry.
Most of the contemporary criticism of the Presi­
dent's action and the purchase was politically motivated. 
Eater authors and historians have accepted most of this 
criticism without evaluation of the sources or investiga­
tion of the facts. Further, this purchase did not create 
a monopoly, indeed it probably prevented a regional
iii
monopoly from coming into being in the South. Finally, 
the prior approval or disapproval of the executive branch 
of the government which was requested for this merger set 
a precedent which is present day govei*nment policy.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The years from 1900 to 1907 were ones of almost
uninterrupted economic expansion and prosperity, except
for a sharp but brief setback in 1903.^ Even the farmer
2
had shared in this upsurge. Despite the good times, 
there was considerable public and political condemnation 
of the growth of large corporations or trusts, as they 
were more frequently called, that had accompanied the 
prosperity. One of the leading critics of the trusts 
was President Roosevelt. Unlike many of the other 
critics, however, he did not believe that the trusts were 
inherently bad. In fact, he believed that large scale 
business activities were an inevitable economic develop­
ment, but that they must be controlled in order to insure
x
their good conduct. His action against the Northern
Henry David et al. , eds., The Economic History of 
The United States, Vol. VII, Harold U. Paulkner, The De­
cline of Laissez-Faire (New York: Rinehart & Company, T951), 
p. ^2~Thereafter cited as Paulkner, Decline of Laissez- 
Faire).
^Ibid., p. 321.
*The New York Times, July 1902; Theodore Eoose- 
velt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Herman Hagedorn,
* u n i i  i mm i p Miiiim a itf i .. i w—wbbo—■—  ,l—mu   .  ______
20 volsT^Chii.’ies^cribner' s Sons, 37926), XV:43-^5•
1
Securities Company, the Beef Trust, and the Standard Oil 
Company earned him the title of ”Trust Buster.” Indeed 
these activities against the trusts led William Jennings 
Bryan to go as far as accusing the President of plagia­
rizing and implementing the "Chicago platform" of the 
Democratic Party in 1896 which had called for stricter 
regulation of the railroads by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and control of the trusts by the federal 
government. On the other hand, early in 1907 when pros­
perity began to fade, many business leaders and journal­
ists blamed Roosevelt *s anti-trust activities for the 
business recession.
Late in October, 1907, the recession reached the 
"panic" stage: many banks failed, panicked depositors of
apparently solvent banks aggravated conditions by demand­
ing their money, and in many parts of the country script
money issued by local banks was replacing the rapidly
5disappearing currency. The New York bankers, led by 
J. P. Morgan, attempted to prevent further bank failures 
by making assets available to financial institutions that
Paolo Coletta, William Jennings Br.yan, Vol. I, 
William Jennings Bryan, Political“Evangelist: 1860-1908
yni-niiiTni—iwniHT-i i—itwmii i r"_v-r -tit -St ------—a*—-------*------------^ y- ...................., „i »■ n
^Lincoln, Nebraska: university Press, I9b4j, p. 373»
^"Severity of the 1907 Panic," Review of Reviews, 
November, 1908, Vol. 38, p. 537*
6were pressed by their creditors.
When it appeared that the banking and brokerage
firm of Moore and Schley with debts of over $38,000,000
was about to fail, Morgan proposed to Gary that the U.S.
Steel Corporation buy the stock of T.C.I. and R. Co. that
Moore and Schley had used as collateral for a large share
of its loans. The avowed purpose of this proposal was to
prevent Moore and Schley*s failure by providing it with
7credible and liquid assets. Gary reluctantly agreed to 
the plan on 3 November, subject to the condition, that 
Roosevelt and the government would give assurance that the 
U.S. Steel Corporation would not be prosecuted for viola- 
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Since Morgan wished to announce the sale prior to 
the opening of the New York Stock Exchange on the follow­
ing morning, Gary went to Washington in the early morning
o
hours of 4 November to confer with the President. In­
terrupting the President's breakfast, Gary briefly out­
lined the problem without mentioning the name of the firm
Frederick Lewis Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan 
(New York: Harper & Brothers,
?!T.S. Congress, House, Special Committee to In­
vestigate Whether U.S. Steel Corporation or other ^ Corpora- 
t£onsnava"Tiolated Antitrust ^ScF^FF^TS^nT^^B^nH’^ ongTT 
Pd sess., p. 107 (hereafter cited as Stanley Hearings;.
8It>id., pp. 1605, 1606.
that was in danger of failing. He-,said that the
threatened company possessed a majority of the T.C.I. and
R. Co. stock, and that under ordinary conditions, his
corporation would be reluctant to buy the T.C.I. and R.
Co. since it would raise their control of the steel in-
9
dustry by 4 or 5 per cent. Nevertheless, it would not 
raise the corporation's total control of the industry to 
above the 60 per cent limit that the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion had established for itself.
Because the Attorney-General was not in the 
capital, Roosevelt called Secretary of State Elihu Root, 
an experienced corporation lawyer whom the President
considered highly competent on trust problems, to advise
11him on the subject." Since Root could find no legal
barriers to the acquisition, Roosevelt said that although
he could not approve it, he would interpose no objec- 
12tions. The sale was immediately announced to the
13press.
9Ibid., pp. 1122, 1379- 10Ibld., p. 1122.
U.S. Congress, House, Special Committee to In-
vestigate Whether the United States Steel* Corporation or 
UtEerCorporatTons or (TtTEer'"Persons ^ToTaTeH'uHe^jrET^' 
Trust Act of 1890 v House Report Il^ 7T~"6'2nd CongT, 2d sess. 
tart m i  p” 5”5^hereafter cited as Stanley Report—  
Minority). “ ~
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1122.
^ The New York Times, November 1907> p. 1-
5The firm of Moore and Schley did not fail. Within
a few days after this event, it was apparent that the depth
of the Panic had passed; within days, magazine stories were
referring to the Panic in the past tense. Many of these
14stories hailed Morgan as the savior of the situation.
Roosevelt*s anti-business attitude was featured in many
15others as the cause of the Panic. Significantly, in view 
of later developments, no adverse comments can be found re­
garding the U.S. Steel Corporation’s acquisition of the 
T.C.I. and R. Co. except in William Jennings Bryan*s weekly 
newspaper Commoner, which was published in Lincoln, Nebras­
ka. Speaking editorially on 22 November 1907? the paper 
said that the merger of these two corporations was another 
link in the chain of monopoly and that only time would tell 
what effect it would have on the public interests of the 
South. ^
The issue lay dormant until the Presidential cam­
paign of 1908. The Democratic nominee, William Jennings 
Bryan, limited his remarks about the U.S. Steel Corporation 
to a typical campaign charge that the Steel Trust had pur­
chased immunity from prosecution under the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Act by contributing to the Republican campaign fund.
^"Mr. Morgan, The Man of the Hour,” Literary 
Digest, November 9, 1907, Vol. 37> P« 676.
15Xbid., p. 669.
^Commoner, November 22, 190?, p. 6.
 ^wwtmjiHti.. 1 w»i im.iw mwt' '
6Then William Randolph Hearst, the Independent Party candi­
date for President, made the sensational charge that 
Charles N. Haskell, the Governor of Oklahoma and Treasurer 
of the Democratic Party, was and had been an agent of the 
Standard Oil Company for some time. When Bryan rose to 
Haskell's defense and pointed to the lack of evidence, 
Roosevelt quickly corroborated Hearst's charges by pro­
ducing evidence from the government's case against Standard
17Oil that was in adjudication at that time. (
Hearst next produced court records to show that 
Haskell had acted as an agent in the organization of the 
U.S. Steel Corporation, receiving a fee of $50>000 for 
handling the transfer of ore lands and stock between com­
panies. The record stipulated that the fee represented 1
18per cent of the transaction. On the day after Hearst 
made this disclosure, Bryan charged that Roosevelt had al­
lowed the Steel Trust to buy one of its largest rivals and
19obtain 50 per cent of the market. It is noteworthy that 
neither in these, nor in later remarks about the merger, 
did Bryan refer to the T.C.I. and R. Co. by name.
Yet no doubt was to be left in the reading public's
mind about the identity of the companies involved. Within
^^Omaha Bee, September 24, 1907* p. 2.
18Ibid., September 25, 1907, p. 2.
~*~^ Ibld., September 27, 1907, p. 2.
748 hours after Bryan made his charge, Roosevelt revealed
his role in the affair, specifying the time, the people
involved, and the necessity for this transaction as it
20was presented to him by Gary.
The issue was then dropped only to reappear when
Congress reconvened after the election of 1908. At that
time the Chairman of the Democratic caucus, Senator Charles
Culberson, introduced a resolution that requested the
Attorney-General to inform the Senate if the government
was suing the U.S. Steel Corporation under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act because of its absorption of the T.C.I. and 
21R. Co. When the Attorney-General replied that no action 
was being taken by the Justice Department, Culberson 
countered with a resolution to investigate the absorption 
of T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel Corporation. Cul­
berson’s resolution was passed unanimously by the Repub­
lican controlled Senate which, like Roosevelt, showed no 
reticence about having this affair exposed to public
20Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, ed. Elting Morison,*~3ohiT3lum7~anT^Uohn~Buckley, 
B~vols. (Cambridge, Hass.: Harvard University Press, 1951- 
1954-) R* to W. J. Bryan, September 27, 1908, VI:1259.
21U.S. Congress, Senate, Inquiry to the Attorney 
General Asking Whether Suit was Instituted~Undexr Sherman
"Absorption. m »■ ■ i«r. «rr«—jttwtm
. Res.
909, 60th Cong., 2d sess.
Act Against United Stat¥sTteeTc^rporatTonAor
i . n 1 1 n —mi II . n«Wj«ii 1—>1.1 mi >ii~T n ■ iff in n run ---- i rrr~i----- „|T .. . -------—  r i ------------------1 'i----r — ----- ■ i i ■ h ■■ r~ ■ i ■ -| — i a ■' ■■ jiijmh
of Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad. Company, S
8scrutiny.^
The investigation was completed in less than 60 
days. Roosevelt refused to give the committee any informa­
tion that the government had about the Steel Corporation,
except for the correspondence dealing with the government’s
23part in the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co.  ^ Very 
few witnesses were called by this investigating committee 
and the conclusions drawn by the Committee were divided 
along party lines. The report of the Democratic members of 
the committee contained the principal charges that have 
been made in connection with this merger. Briefly these 
allegations were that the purchase constituted a violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; that the' President was not 
authorized to permit the absorption; that the property was 
worth several hundred million dollars; and ". . . that 
among the larger benefits which the Steel Corporation de­
rives from the merger are the control of the open-hearth 
production of steel rails, the ultimate control of the 
iron ore of the country, a practical monopoly of the iron 
and steel trade of the South and the elimination of a
22U.S. Congress, Senate, Investigation of the 
Absorption of Tennessee Coal, Iron and RaTl.road Company 
by the United States Steel Corporation, S. Re*sT~2h3, 60th 
Cong., 2d sess.
^ Outlook, January 16, 1909, Vol. 91, p* 88.
924-strong and growing competition,” The committee made no 
legislative recommendations and, aside from the publicity 
it received due to Roosevelt's refusal to provide it with 
information, it attracted little attention.
Again the issue disappeared from public view until 
the Democrats gained control of the House of Representa­
tives in the elections of 1910. On 16 May 1911 the House 
passed a resolution which authorized a sub-committee of 
the Judiciary Committee to investigate the Steel Trust. 
This group, generally called the Stanley Committee after 
its Chairman, Democratic Congressman Augustus 0. Stanley 
of Kentucky, commenced in June, 1911, work that was only 
completed in August, 1912. Unlike the Senate Committee 
which had investigated the absorption of the T.C.I. and R. 
Co., the Stanley Committee attracted much publicity. With
the exception of J. P. Morgan, every important figure in
25the steel industry testified. A large part of the evi­
dence collected dealt with details of the purchase of the 
T.C.I. and R. Co. Theodore Roosevelt's appearance as a 
volunteer witness in August, 1911, was the high point of 
the hearing.
24-U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, 
Absorption of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. by the 
Xlnited States Steel CorporationTTearing before a sub-
fri -irr- ~r t r rwi ■■ in  m h— i iihim hi m i»i»i n ran i i m n  ~i i i '> ■ in i n _ in i n ' i n— i— ~i i rr ir — ■ m u  ■ rn i r i n r i  P' mi'i n  .. #  .  .
committee of the Judiciary Committee, Senate Doc. 44-,
62nd Cong., 1st sess. (hereafter, cited as Absorption by 
The United States Steel Corporation).
^^The New York Times, August 3, 1912, p. 2.
10
When the committee published its findings a year 
later, the Democratic majority condemned Roosevelt for 
failure to interfere with the merger, stating that the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not give the President the 
authority to refuse to take action in such cases. Fur­
ther, the majority report stated that although the posi­
tion of the U.S. Steel Corporation was once due to busi­
ness acumen, ”. . . the [present] dominance of the Steel 
Corporation . . .  is due to the sudden, ill-considered and 
arbitrary fiat of the executive.” The minority report, 
predictably, supported former President Roosevelt’s
27action. 1
While the Stanley Committee was-sitting, two 
other events took place. On 1 July 1911 the Commissioner 
of Corporations issued an exhaustive report on the steel 
industry that had been in preparation for over five years. 
The most important conclusion of this report stated ”. . . 
it is apparent that the United States Steel Corporation 
does not have a monopoly in the production of iron and
26U.S. Congress, Special Committee'to Investigate 
Whether United States Steer^orpor^ToiT'o^ r OtlTe^ T^Toroora- 
tions or Persons Viol a ted"' the "Ant i - TrruPt" AcP""of"^ 16 90 > H. 
Rept 11.P7 > 61Pnd~Tfoiigd ses'sTP Part I, p,~~20Y'"{Hereaft'er 
cited as Stanley Report--Majority).
27Stanley Report--Minority, p. 93»
11
28steel.” This statement was qualified by the remark that 
". . . the Steel Corporation does occupy a position in the 
iron-ore industry, which while by no means constituting a 
monopoly, is clearly indicative of monopolistic influence." 
Further, the report said, "The acquisition of the Tennessee 
Coal, Iron and Railroad Company likewise was apparently 
desirable more on account of the enormous ore resources of
29the company than because of its manufacturing plants. . ."
The publication of this report caused no tremors, 
one paper pointing out its uncontroversial nature by.noting 
that its issuance was immediately followed by a rise in the 
price of U.S. Steel Corporation common stock. However, 
the report was the only comprehensive statistical picture 
of the U.S. Steel Corporation in the first decade of its 
existence.
Less than four months after the Bureau of Corpora­
tions Report was issued, the Department of Justice brought 
suit against U.S. Steel Corporation for violation of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Among the several causes for the
28U.S., Department of Commerce, Report of the Com- 
missioner of Corporations on the Steel Industry, July 1, 
T^lT^^X^ashington, D.C.: Government^Printing Office, 1911), 
Part I. p. 37? (hereafter cited as Bureau of Corporations 
Report).
w m m rm  n>
29Ibid.
30y U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Corpora­
tions, Investigation of the United States Steel Corpora­
tion, 1903-1911, p- 16, Pile !D067~Kg l3?~National 
Archives, Washington, D. C. (hereafter cited as Bureau of 
Corporations Steel Investigation).
12
action listed in the government's brief, was the acquisi­
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co. Charging that Roosevelt had 
been misled by Gary, the brief stated that 11. . . nothing 
less than control of the Tennessee Company was considered 
by the Steel Corporation,” and that . . there was a 
desire to assume control of a company and purpose to ac­
quire control of a company that had recently assumed a 
position of potential competition of great significance.” 
Adding specifications to these intentions, the brief said 
that the U.S. Steel Corporation had by this merger acquired 
4-00,000,000 tons of iron ore which greatly strengthened its 
control of the iron ore supply of the country and that it 
had assumed a predominant position in the iron and steel 
trade of the South.^
The suit against the U.S. Steel Corporation had 
immediate political repercussions. Roosevelt not only 
vehemently denied that he had been misled by Gary, but used 
this denial as a springboard for an attack on the anti­
trust policies of his chosen successor, President William 
Howard Taft. Roosevelt described Taft’s indiscriminate 
attacks 'on the trusts as being as outmoded as the flint­
locks of Washington’s army, saying that, "The effort to 
prohibit all combinations, bad or good, is bound to fail, 
and ought to fail." At the same time he reiterated the
^ The New York Times, October 27, 1911, p. 1.
13
demands that he had made as President for the regulation 
of the trusts.-^ Many leaders of the Republican Party, 
dissatisfied with Taft, turned to Roosevelt for leader­
ship, and his bolt to Bull-Moose Progressivism helped a 
divided party to go down in defeat in the Presidential 
election of 1912.
Although the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, 
attacked the Steel Trust during the campaign, he made no 
allusion to the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. How­
ever, Bryan, in a book published during the campaign, al­
luded to the purchase, stating that "Roosevelt allowed the 
Steel Corporation to swallow its largest rival® Ho
record can be found of any answer to this charge, and the 
purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel 
Corporation died as a political issue in the campaign of 
1912.
After nine years in the federal courts, the Supreme 
Court in 1920 dismissed the governments complaint against 
the U.S. Steel Corporation on all counts. Although this 
legally buried the charge that the corporation had viola­
ted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and that Roosevelt had
^Theodore Roosevelt, "The Trusts, the People, and 
the Square Deal," Outlook, November 18, 1911, Vol. 99, 
pp. 649-656.
^William Jennings Bryan, A Tale of Two Conven­
tions, ed. Virgil V. McNitt (New YorkT'Tunk^nd’lTagnalls, 
p. 306.
14
■been a party to the violation, it has not prevented’ the 
periodic revival of criticism by authors such as Matthew 
Josephson, Gabriel Kolko, and Ferdinand Lundberg.
Most of the critics have attacked the principals 
in this affair for using what today might be called sharp 
business practices, using much of the same evidence that 
the Senate investigation of the absorption of the T.C.I* 
and R. Co. and the Stanley Committee gathered and that the 
government set forth in its unsuccessful suit. Most of 
these critics, by presenting only fragments of the evi­
dence, have failed to present a coherent picture of this 
merger and the events that led up to it. Likewise, most 
of them have failed to analyze the motives of the Con­
gressional groups that conducted these investigations and 
the motives of the Taft Administration in not bringing 
this suit until the fall of 1911. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court decision of 1920, because it dealt mostly 
with the legal aspects of monopoly, shed no light on these 
aspects of this case.
 ^Matthew Josephson, The President Makers: The 
Culture of Politics and LeadeFslTI^~3n~~An~^^aMof'^hrir<hten- 
man¥^1896-d9l^lNew York: Harcourt Brace and Company> 
1940JT PP« 253-55; Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Con- 
servatism: A Reinterpretation of American hnatopy~T900- 
1916 T re s F ^ T  GlencToe?^ T963T7np*~”Y14;
Ferdinand Lundberg, America’s 60 Families (New York: 
Vanguard Press, 19377TTF*~”9l^2.
CHAPTER II
JOHN W. GATES AND THE SYNDICATE
The chain of events that led to the acquisition 
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel Corporation 
actually began in the 1890's when capitalists put together 
the various medium sized combinations that, following a 
subsequent consolidation, became the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion. In many ways it is the story of two tycoons: one,
John W. Gates, whose name has been rarely connected with 
the acquisition of the southern iron and steel company, 
and the other, J. P. Morgan, who has been accused directly
and indirectly of using or causing the Panic of 1907 to
2promote this acquisition.
Gates, like the better known Charles Schwab and 
Andrew Carnegie, was one of the principal figures in the 
huilding of a large scale American steel industry. His 
company, the American Steel and V/ire Company, legally
^Xda M. Tarbell, The Life of Elbert Gary: A Story 
in Steel (New York: D. Appleton "U^iFury^ompai^V^^^TT^ 
p. f98~Xhereafter cited as Tarbell, Gary). Tarbell. merely 
mentions that Gates was a member of the pool that owned 
the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Raili*oad Company.
16
monopolized the barbed wire production of the United States
*
simply by owning all the patents for its manufacture. By 
his ora admission* Gates made full use of this monopoly to
Zl
advance the price of barbed wire. The output of his 
company was by no means limited to barbed wire; it, like 
most steel companies, turned out a variety of finished and 
unfinished iron and steel products. Accordingly the 
American Steel and Wire Company both shared in the general 
prosperity of the steel business immediately prior to the 
turn of the century and was constantly threatened by the 
cutthroat competition characteristic of this industry.
For Gates, or for any large steel manufacturer, 
the two most important competitors were J, P, Morgan and 
Andrew Carnegie, each of whom controlled large steel cor­
porations. Morgan, because of his financial resources, 
was well equipped to weather a long siege of stiff, price 
cutting competition, yet Morgan.had already established a 
reputation for not initiating such competition and for 
trying to prevent it. Carnegie, unlike Morgan, was a 
combative competitor, who easily made up what he lacked 
in financial resources by being an increasingly efficient
^Paulkner, Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 159.
^Ibid.
^Frederick Lewis Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, l9^ "9J7" P* 1727*
17
steel maker. He threatened to move into other steel 
manufacturers' fields, threatened to build a fleet of ore 
boats to assure his source of raw materials, and even 
threatened to build a railroad parallel to the Pennsyl­
vania Railroad, which itself controlled a steel company.
Despite these tactics, Carnegie wished to retire 
and much of his aggressiveness was directed toward forcing 
his harassed competitors to buy him out. When the Rocke­
fellers attempted to form a combination of the larger steel 
companies to purchase Carnegie's interests, they were 
forced to abandon the project because they could not mobi­
lize the capital needed for such a large operation. Shortly 
after this independent steel manufacturers, harassed by 
Carnegie's competition and also wishing to enjoy the bene­
fits of large scale specialized steel manufacturing, ap­
pealed to Morgan to form a combination that would buy 
Carnegie out. Morgan, sensing that stock market condi­
tions were ripe for the flotation of the huge amount of
*
securities necessary for such an undertaking, agreed to 
form the combination, and in 1901 the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion, the first corporation to be capitalized at over one 
billion dollars, was founded.
The foundation was not without birth pains. Gates 
who had been the one of the architects of the new
6corporation found that his, services were no longer de­
sired by Morgan once the huge corporation had been organ­
ized. His buccaneer methods, which were well known to 
Wall Street insiders, such as selling stock in his own 
companies short and then reaping a stock profit when he
unexpectedly shut down his plants, were repugnant to
n
Morgan’s rigid sense of business propriety.r
Consequently Gates had no part in the management 
of the new corporation. His lingering bitterness came 
out during the Stanley Committee Hearings when he testi­
fied that he would be ashamed to admit to the small 
financial remuneration he had received as one of its 
organizers.^
Although Morgan and Gates had no personal contacts 
after 1901, their business relationship was far from over. 
Gates not only continued to expand his holdings in the 
iron and steel industry, but moved into the railroad busi­
ness in a series of predatory stock market operations that 
gained control of small but key railroads which could be 
used to harass the major operating systems. His most 
sensational attack was on the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, a line that was thought to be safely in the
;— Minority, p. 7*
^The New York Times, May 30, 1911, p. 2.
19
control of August Belmont. Gates created a corner in the
stock of this railroad in April, 1902, causing a minor
panic when he threatened to make the speculators who had
q
sold its stock short deliver their shares.y The Belmont in­
terests appealed to Morgan, who by now had become the arbi­
ter of the American financial community, to restore the 
railroad to their management.^
Morgan sent George Perkins, his senior partner, 
to deal with Gates. After around the clock negotiations 
Gates surrendered his interests in the Louisville and 
Nashville for 43,860,000 dollars.^ Perkins observed that
Gates had a taste of blood and that he would be heard from
. 12again.
Morgan expressed his view of the Louisville and 
Nashville affair and Gates' character when he testified 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1903 that 
Gates was only interested in the transaction and not in 
the transportation needs of the South when he acquired the 
railroad.^ As Perkins predicted, Gates was heard from
^The Neiv York Times, May 30, 1911» p. 2.
John A. Garraty, Right-Hand Man: The Life of 
George W. Perkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, ”Tub*lTshers, 
T93'7T7np^*^^'~^^reafte3? cited as Garraty, Right-Hand Man).
^ Ibid., p. 153. ^ Ibid., p. 152.
■tTohn Moody and George Kibbe Turner, ’’Masters of 
Capital in America,” McClure's Magazine, January, 1911,
Vol. 36, p. 34-6.
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again. When Gates acquired the Cincinnati, Hamilton and
Dayton Railroad, a key connecting line in southern Ohio,
14Morgan again bought Gates out.
Nevertheless, the extent of Gates' excursions 
into the railroad business was limited since nearly all 
of the roads had been incorporated into large rail systems 
that were safely in the hands of financiers who.were more 
than capable of defending themselves against stock market 
operators. However, Gates' acquisition of railroads merely 
to earn a quick profit intensified the distrust that 
Morgan already held for him."^
By 1905 newspaper stories made it apparent that 
Gates planned to expand his interests in the steel and iron 
business. Already in possession of the Republic Steel 
Company xvhich owned properties in both the Lake district of 
upper Michigan and Minnesota and in the Birmingham district 
of Alabama, the reports said that Gates planned to form a 
combination, using the T.C.I. and R. Co. as a nucleus, that 
would control the southern output of pig iron and prac­
tically all the finished iron and steel made in that sec- 
tion. Although Gates' reasons for making the T.C.I. and
^The New York Times, May 30, 1911» p. 2.Unn—mw mmi^ rnu iitiiih iw i—timibi   ... hiihiih.m / . V 1 f A*
15Ibid., May 29, 1911, p. 1.
^Ibid., February 22, 1905, p- 14-; April 1, 1905,
p. 15; Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation Rile
2612-1-3=2: " —  ‘
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R. Co, the key company in the proposed combination remained 
unknown even after investigations by the Bureau of Corpora­
tions and both houses of Congress, the most likely reasons 
were that the company's control of a large share of 
Birmingham district's iron ore reserves would assure a 
source of raw materials and at the same time make a good 
advertising point for the marketing of the company's secu­
rities.
In the beginning Gates' part in the attempted com­
bination was not generally known, but by April, 1905, his
17role was correctly described in the press. Actually the
maneuvering to effect the consolidation began in February,
181904, with a flurry of published rumors. Substance was
added to the rumors when the syndicate bought the T.C.I.
^ 19and R. Co. in February, 1905, and then used this cor­
poration to buy the Birmingham and Southern Railroad, an 
ore road that serviced the entire Birmingham mining
district and as a terminal railroad connected the trunk
20lines that served Birmingham. At the same time the new 
management of the T.C.I. and R. Co., which was largely
^ The New York Times, April 1, 1905, p. 15-
^Ibid., February 22, 1904, p. 14. ~^ Ibid.
20Ethel Armes, The Story of Coal and Iron in Ala­
bama (Cambridge, Mass. : The fiarvard University !Press, 1910),
p. 514 (hereafter cited as Armes, Coal and Iron); The New
York Times, July 5, 1906, p. 10.
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comprised of the officers of Gates* Republic Steel
Company began by increments to increase the corporation’s
21capitalization by the issuance of common stock. Al­
though these issues were publicly advertised they were 
sold for the most part only to the syndicate that had 
purchased the T.C.I. and R. Co.
What the true intentions of Gates and the syndi­
cate were may never be learned but the conditions that 
prompted them to attempt to combine the iron and steel 
companies of the Birmingham district were a result of tech­
nical developments and business conditions that appeared to 
favor the amalgamation of a large steel company in the 
South.
Prior to the general conversion from the production 
of Bessemer steel to the manufacture of open-hearth steel 
which began in the 1890's, the Birmingham district was not 
thought of as a steel manufacturing area since the dis­
trict's ores contained too much phosphorous for the
22Bessemer process. However the non-Bessemer ores of the 
district were suitable for producing open-hearth steel by 
the duplex process. Nevertheless a disadvantage still
21Commercial and Financial Chronicle, September 22, 
p. 704-; Februar3r~27~™T9Q7T P* "^ 75; October T?, 19071 p. 923*
22Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A
* ■ i . . r . r » i < n  ■itrw.ii n t m i irn i iW «i ir T -' a M  i nr i n . i ^ ' m  B W l i w n. t i n i i w n n w i n ■-»< in, n- grnr-.ii irnrMi—  -  wttti nr  rr^rr7rm-TTTM-tQ^r--r-iT
Study in Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel in 11, 
North Carolina: The University of” North Carolina Press, 
1932), p. 302 (hereafter cited as Vance,
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existed since the duplex process, as the name suggests,
required a double manufacturing cycle by which the ore was
converted in scrap metal and then re~manufactured into
23open-hearth steel. ^ Also a comparative economic disad­
vantage existed with the more industrialized sections of 
the country in the manufacture of steel since in these 
areas large quantities of obsolescent and discarded 
finished iron and steel products were returned to the
mills as relatively cheap raw material for the open-hearth 
24-process. At the same time the suitability of scrap 
material to the open-hearth process in place of the pig 
iron which was a necessity of the Bessemer process and 
which was also the principal product of the Birmingham 
district, relatively decreased the dependence of the north­
ern steel makers on this district as a source of raw 
25materials. y The greatest disadvantage for the Birmingham 
district was that no local markets existed and transporta­
tion costs prevented Birmingham from being a true com- 
petitor in the northern markets. In fact the Birmingham
25Ibid. , p. 505. 2h b i d .. p. 306.
25^Richard Hartshorne, "The Iron and Steel Industry 
of the United States," Journal of Geography,. Aprilv 1929, 
Vol. XXVIII, p. 137 (hereafter cited aiHartshorne, "Iron 
and St e e1 Indus try").
26Ibid.
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district was not destined to rival Gary or Pittsburgh as a
27steel producing center because of the market factors. '
The questionable technical advantage and inherent
economic disadvantages were offset by extraordinarily
prosperous business conditions and a seemingly insatiable
demand for steel. In 1905 steel production had increased
28by 100 per cent over the figure for 1900 encouraging ex­
pansion of steel production facilities. At the same time 
there was a general rise in the price of securities. This 
condition particularly suited Gates' method of operation. 
Always a bull in the stock market, Gates had used rising 
stock prices to manipulate a financial maneuver that might 
be Galled a stock flotation-option device to finance his 
previous successful combinations.
As described in testimony in an equity suit in 
1902,^ and by his secretary twenty years later,^ the 
operation was uncomplicated as long as the prices of secu­
rities were rising or could be made to rise. The
27Ibid., p. 150.
28Arthur P. Burns, Production Trends in the United 
States Since 1870 (New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1934), Table 44, p. 296.
^The New York Times, March 18, 1902, p. 9;
March 19, 1902, p . ?.
» 0. A. Owens, "Bet You A Million Gates,” Saturday 
Evening Post,. November 7, 1925, Vol. 198, p. 225.
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syndicate or pool bought control of a corporation which 
functioned as a seed capital source to finance the pro­
posed combination. New issues of common and preferred 
stocks were issued by the corporation and bought by the 
syndicate at inflated prices which caused the stock to be 
quoted at above its actual value on the stock market. At 
the same time both the new stock and the old stock were
used as collateral for margin loans with which to pay for
new issues of stock and to take options to buy the stock 
of the companies that were to be included in the new 
combination when the price of the stock of these companies 
had risen to the value that had been agreed upon in the 
option. The natural upswing in bull market prices coupled 
with the rumors of the impending consolidation should then
have caused a rise in the stock value of these companies
and enabled the syndicate to effect the combination by 
executing its options. The inflated stock of the corpora­
tion that had financed the operation was then exchanged 
for the stock of the companies to be acquired. Although 
this plan was followed in attempting to combine the south­
ern iron and steel companies, it failed of execution.
The Gates syndicate had purchased a larger part,
if not all, of the new issues of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
31common s t o c k . G r a n t  B. Schley, the senior partner in
 ^Stanley- Report--Majority, p. 190.
2 6
the New York brokerage firm of Moore and Schley was the
financial manager of the syndicate. In the syndicate
agreement the poi^ers given to Schley provide an insight
into the intentions of the syndicate and also into its
problems. Schley was empowered to sell the syndicate's
stock, but only at a profit, indicating a speculative in- 
32tent. He could pledge the stock as collateral for 
33loans.^ His testimony showed that he secured 35*000,000
dollars in loans with the T.C.I. and R. Co. common 
34.
stock. However the par valuation of the total common 
stock issued was only 32,900,000 dollars.^ When a 
general decline in stock prices in 1907 caused Schley's 
creditors to demand that he substitute a more reliable 
collateral than the T.C.I. and R. Co. common stock, and 
when he failed to meet these demands, the device by which 
Gates put together his previous combinations collapsed.
Two reasons account for the syndicate's failure 
to combine the southern iron and steel companies. The 
first was Gates' unsavory reputation with the financial 
community and the investing public. In the syndicate's 
two and a half years of operation prior to the Panic of
32Stanley Report— Minority, p. 51*
55Ibid.
^\fal.l Street Journal, August 3, 1911, P* 3*
^ The New York Times, June 2, 1911, p. 3*
27
1907, Gates* well known but never publicly acknowledged 
role, undoubtedly caused investors to shy away from the 
companies which the syndicate intended to combine. Writ­
ing many years later, his secretary noted that Gates’ name 
had acquired a taint that made him reprehensible to the 
responsible members of the financial community.
Nor was Gates' disrepute limited to the business 
world. His published testimony in 1902 regarding the 
organization of the American and Steel Wire Company re­
vealed that he could not remember what happened to
26,000,000 dollars worth of the corporation's stock that 
37disappeared. Newspaper articles about his activities
38bore derogatory headlines such as ''Gates Seizes TCI Fast1
3 9
or "Kansas Southern Taken From Harriman* Likewise his
well publicized, profligate gambling habits, involving in 
one instance in 1905 the loss of 50,000 dollars in a single 
bet, brought his name from the financial pages to the front 
page^ under less than desirable conditions for a man whose
360. A. Owens, "Bet You A Million Gates," Saturday 
Evening Post, November 7, 1925, Vol. 198, p. 225.
^ The New York Times, March 19, 1902, p. 7*
^ Ibid. , February 22, 1905, p. 14-.
59Ibid., May 11, 1905, p. 11.
^ Ibid., October 1, 1905, p. 1; November 3, 1905,
P. 11.
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success as an industrial organizer would ultimately depend 
on the confidence of the investing public.
The taint which Gates' secretary spoke of had 
apparently spread well beyond the financial community by 
the spring of 1907* On 23 May Gates publicly announced 
that he was withdrawing from active participation in the
4-1syndicate, but that he was not selling out his interest.
Gates left New York complaining bitterly about the "green
bugs of V/all St.“ who were responsible for the depressed
42security prices.
Actually, the withdrawal did not alter Gates' 
legal relationship with the syndicate, nor did Gates re­
linquish his managerial positions in the T.C.I. and R.
Co. or the Republic Steel Company. Prior to Gates’ state­
ment, the syndicate had announced that it would continue
43to operate despite Gates' withdrawal.  ^ Neither contem­
porary accounts in the press nor subsequent investigations 
by Congressional committees of the events leading to the 
acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. attempted to account 
for Gates' abrupt but well advertised withdrawal. Since 
he did not sever his business relations with the syndicate
^ Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1907, p* 2.
^2Ibid.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 4, 1907,
p. 1037.
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or the steel companies, his withdrawal was more an 
announcement than an actuality, and in the absence of 
other evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that it was 
a public relations ploy. If it was a ploy, it came too 
late, for by the spring of 1907 a second and more over­
riding reason for the failure of the syndicate to combine 
southern companies had developed.
The worldwide economic prosperity showed signs in 
early 1907 of faltering. Financial panics in other coun­
tries preceded the panic which the United States■experi­
enced in late October and early November. A basic cause 
of the financial problem in the United States was that the 
price of stocks relative to interest rate for money was 
too high. Consequently knowledgeable investors trans­
ferred their holdings from stocks to real estate or other
44less liquid forms of capital. Concurrently the interest
rates on bonds steadily rose in 1907* further diverting
45money from the stock market. x The situation of the T.C.I. 
and R. Co. common stock was particularly disadvantageous.
As the average yield on corporate and municipal bonds rose 
to 4.21% in 1 9 0 7 an article in the V/all Street Journal
^Faulkner, Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 29.
^Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers*^UnTvers3TtynPre^¥7^963), 
Table .51? p. 364.
46Ibid., Table 45, p. 341.
$0
showed that the yield on T.C.I, and R. common stock was
only 2.6%. ( An article in the same paper only ten days
previous noted that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had the lowest
balance of earnings (4.2%) available for dividends of
4Bany iron and steel company in the United States. In 
contrast, the U.S. Steel Corporation had a high of 
27.2%.49
The Bureau of Corporations Report on the steel
industry noted that one of the most important factors in
bringing a combination together was a favorable stock mar-
50ket situation. By the spring of 1907 this condition did
not exist. A sharp break in security prices in March, the
51so-called "Silent Panic of 1907,’ signalled accurately
that the business cycle had reached its peak and was
52headed downward to the trough. At this point the syndi­
cate was unable to completely absorb the newest issue of 
T.C.I. and R. Co. stock which was payable in monthly
^Wall Street Journal, May 30, 1907, p. 8.
48Ibid., May 20, 1907, p. 1. 49Ibid.
50Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 6.
^ The New York Times, May 30, 1911, p. 2.
52y Clement Juglar, A Brief History of Panics and 
Their Periodical Occurrence in the'""UfnTtea^tat-es, trans. 
and ed. by DeCourcy W. Thom C3rd~ed.; New York: Augustus M. 
Kelly, Publishers, 1966), pp. 164-63.
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installments." ^
Nevertheless the syndicate attempted to convince
the investing public that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had great-
potential. At approximately the time Gates withdrew from
the syndicate, newspaper articles appeared commenting for
the first time on the colossal iron ore reserves of the
54T.C.I. and R. Co. In one article, a member of the syn-
55dicate estimated the ore reserves at one billion tons. 
While these stories apparently had little effect in pro­
moting the combination, they were significant since the
T.C.I. and R. Co. annual financial statement made no men-
56tion of these resources, while on the other hand these
figures bear a striking similarity to the exaggerated
estimates that were introduced as evidence of T.C.I. and
R. Co.’s mineral resources by the Majority Report of the
57Stanley Committee. '
All hope that the syndicate could combine the 
southern iron and steel companies evaporated when the 
security prices collapsed in March and continued to
-^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 30, 
1907, p. 14077“
^Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1907, p. 1 and 
May 10, 1937, pT7.
55Ibid., May 10, 1907, p. 7-
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 27, 
1907, p. 993.
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decline.^ Gates1 bull market strategem was no longer
workable. The firm corner which the syndicate had in the
T.C.I. and R. Co. stock became a trap when the hard
pressed banks required that Schley substitute a more cred-
59ible collateral for his loans. '
As the general economic conditions worsened,
Schley and the syndicate’s situation worsened. One of 
Schley’s creditors sensed a way out of the dilemma in the 
spring when he let Morgan know that the T.C.I. and R. Co. 
stock was available for sale, but Morgan was unable to 
find a buyer.^ In the latter part of October when the 
Panic of 1907 threatened the entire financial community,
Schley and his brokerage firm faced bankruptcy v/hen the
’ 61 i banks began to call his loans. At this point Schley,
at the urging of another of his creditors, approached 
Morgan through an intermediary and within a week the 
financier arranged its sale to the reluctant management 
of the U.S. Steel Corporation. Amid the welter of
financial nev/s concerning the Panic, the sale caused lit­
tle fanfare and did not become a political matter until 
the election of 1908.
^The New York Times, May 30, 1911* P- 2.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 10, 
1911, p. 1529.
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 15. ^ Ibid. , p. 1054.
6?Corey, House of Morgan, p. 346; Wall Street 
Journal, August 3, 19X1, p. 3*
CHAPTER III
t
THE T.C.I. AND R. CO. ACQUISITION 
FROM A LEGAL STANDPOINT
Two principal allegations were the basis for the 
attacks on the merger of the two companies. The first was 
that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had been violated by the 
intent or conspiracy on the part of the Morgan interests 
and the U.S. Steel Corporation to gain control of the 
T.C.I. and R. Co. The second allegation was that the 
merger had the effect of creating a condition that the 
Sherman Act was designed to prevent.
The Majority Report of the Stanley Committee 
claimed that the Morgan interests and the U.S. Steel Cor­
poration had aggravated and exploited the Panic of 1907 
to gain control of the T.C.I. and R. Co. To support 
this claim, the Majority made the politically sensational 
allegation that Gary had duped Roosevelt when he told the 
President that a large New York concern which faced bank­
ruptcy had among its assets a majority of the T.C.I. and 
R. Co. stock and that this concern had asked the U.S.
Steel Corporation to buy this stock.'1'
34-
The evidence which supported these charges was 
principally gathered by the Senate Committee which made 
a perfunctory investigation of the absorption of the 
T.C.I. and R. Co. and the Stanley Committee. Although 
later writers commenting on this case have relied on the 
Stanley Report and the Stanley Hearings for source mater­
ial, the evidence in both of these sources is incomplete. 
Neither Morgan, nor George Kessler who was a link between 
Morgan and the syndicate, were called as witnesses, al­
though the minority members of the Committee requested 
their presence.^ Another defect in these sources is that 
the members of the Stanley Committee, both majority and 
minority, either through lack of professional legal com­
petence or because of unaccountable ulterior motives, 
failed to thoroughly question witnesses or confront wit­
nesses xtfith obvious inconsistencies and gaps in their 
testimony.
To examine the basis of the charge that Morgan 
and the U.S. Steel Corporation intended or conspired to 
take over the T.C.I. and R. Co., and by an adroit decep­
tion used the Panic of 1907 to accomplish this end, the 
evidence presented to the Stanley Committee and the 
events as they occurred in 1907 must be recounted in more 
detail. Some time in the spring of 1907 (the date was 
not specified in the evidence), George Kessler, an
p
Stanley Committee— Minority, p. 63.
-   | - . —  . | C./ Ill II T l 11 ' II ■ IT'      -   - • |- ■ I II l III ■  I I I II.
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erstwhile member of the Gates syndicate and creditor of
Schley, told Morgan that the syndicate was willing to sell
out. Both Gary’s and Gates* testimony agreed on this
point. Morgan relayed the offer to Gary v/ho rejected it.-
Gary also testified that representatives of the
syndicate had approached him several times in 1907 prior
to the Panic with offers to sell, but that he had refused
them.^ Nevertheless, there had been some interest within
the U.S. Steel Corporation in buying the T.C.I. and R.
Co., at least at a lower echelon. James Gayley, vice-
president of the U.S. Steel Corporation, advised buying
the T.C.I. and R. Co. when it was selling at 50 dollars a
share, but this proposition was turned down due to the
opposition of Henry Prick, director of the U.S. Steel Cor- 
n
poration.r No evidence, other than Gayley*s advice and 
Morgan's relaying Kessler's offer to Gary, showed that 
there was any interest or intention on the part of Morgan 
or the U.S. Steel Corporation to buy the T.C.I. and R. Co.
To prove their contention that the Panic had been 
aggravated by the Morgan interests, the Majority Report
^The New York Times, June 3, 1911, p. 3* The 
Stanley Hearings^were v/*eIl~”covered by the New York papers, 
particularly Tne New York Times.
^Ibid. , p. 1. h b i d . 6Ibid.
7
f S t a n l e y  H e a r i n g , p .  4 0 2 .
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quoted the testimony of Oakleigh Thorne, president of the 
Trust Company of America and member of the Gates syndi­
cate. Thorne stated that a newspaper story which he at-
o
tributed to George Perkins had started a run on his bank.
Although Thorne’s statement was unequivocal, the evidence
which he offered to prove that Perkins made the statement
was the hearsay of another party who himself was only
9
making circumstantial assumptions. Despite extensive 
questioning of Perkins before the Stanley Committee, 
particularly by its Chairman, neither Stanley nor other 
members of the Committee asked Perkins about this charge.
The newspaper story to which Thorne referred out­
lined the problems of the New York banks and mentioned 
Thorne’s bank in particular; however, the substance of 
the article was that arrangements had been made to provide 
Thorne’s bank with sufficient cash reserves to weather the 
Panic.^ Morgan was identified as the moving force in 
providing this assistance. Within a few hours after this 
story was published on the morning of 23 October, a run 
started on the Trust Company of America. If Perkins made 
the statement to the press about the assistance to the 
Trust Company of America, the reaction certainly made it
^Ibid.» pp. 1660-64. ^Ibid.t p. 1700.
i o
The New York Times, October 23, 1907, P* !•
3*7
seem maladroit. On the other hand, nothing aside from 
this purported statement was introduced to show that there 
was any intent on the part of Morgan or his partners to 
start a run on Thorne's bank.
Balanced against this statement about Perkins was 
Thorne's testimony to the Stanley Committee concerning 
Morgan. Testifying to his great esteem for Morgan, Thorne 
related that the financier personally loaned him 10,000,000 
dollars to cover the run on his bank on 23 October and 
arranged for the loan of an additional 15,000,000 dollars.*1*1
The main effort by the majority members of the 
Stanley Committee to establish that an intent existed to 
acquire the T.C.I. and E. Co. centered on the affairs of 
Grant Schley and the banking and brokerage house which he 
headed. Schley, as the financial manager of the Gates 
syndicate, undoubtedly could have provided the Stanley 
Committee with the true aims of the Gates syndicate and 
the reason for the apparent desire of the syndicate to 
sell out even before the Panic of 1907. The questioning 
of Schley by the majority members of the Stanley Committee 
was designed only to establish that the machinations of 
the Morgan interests had brought about Schley's problems 
in order to force him to sell the T.C.I. and R. Co.
11S t a n le y  H e a r i n g s , p p .  1 6 6 4 ,  1 6 6 6 .
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12stock* No allusions were made to the attempts of the
Gates syndicate to combine the southern iron and steel
companies, but the ownership of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by
the syndicate was treated as a major threat to the U.S.
Steel Corporation and ascribed as the motive for the ac-
13quisition of the company. v Neither the majority nor the 
minority members of the Committee made a serious attempt 
to probe the motives of the syndicate members. For ex­
ample, when Gates appeared as the first witness before the 
Committee, he was questioned about the intentions of the 
syndicate. He reminded the Chairman Stanley that he had 
been called as a witness to answer questions about the 
U.S. Steel Corporation, but not his own companies.14 No 
further questions were asked along this line.
While the motives and intentions of the syndicate 
remained undisclosed, its difficulties were brought to 
light by the testimony of many witnesses, particularly 
Schley. In questioning Schley, majority members of the 
Committee attempted to establish two incompatible facts: 
that the Morgan interests or the U.S. Steel Corporation 
had coerced him into selling a controlling interest in the 
T.C.I. and R. Co. to the U.S. Steel Corporation, and that
1?Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 176-77 and Stanley 
Hearings, pp. l09U730^I7TTlJ7“ 1114.
13^Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 176-77*
14S t a n le y  H e a r i n g s , p .  1 3 *
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neither Schley nor the firm of Moore and Schley had con­
trol of the T.C.I. and R. Co.'s common stock. Exhaustive 
questioning of Schley by the majority members of the 
Committee failed to support either of these contentions, 
while cross-examination by the minority members revealed 
the desperate financial problems of the syndicate by the 
fall of 1907.
As a witness, Schley was often contradictory and 
unresponsive. Nevertheless his testimony is valuable 
since in the main other witnesses amplified and corrobor­
ated it. This testimony showed the syndicate members, 
not as men of almost unlimited financial means, as the
Majority Report said, but as financially embarrassed stock
15market manipulators, with Schley as their harassed agent. ^
Leonard Hanna, one of the principal members of the 
Gates syndicate, described how the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock 
had been manipulated. The syndicate had moved into the 
market when the stock was selling for 50 dollars a share, 
bid it up to 130 dollars a share, and pegged it at ap­
proximately this value. The stock did not follow the 
general decline of security prices in 1907. Hanna ex­
plained this by calling it an uncurrent stock. Elaborat­
ing on the term, he testified that it was closely held and
■^Stanley Hearings, pp. 1110, 1126: Absorption by 
the United btates Steel Corporation, p. 10 3 •
1 6that there were few stock market transactions in it. He
also noted that it was overvalued since it only paid a
four per cent dividend and that there was absolutely no
17market for it. 1
Exactly how closely the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock
was held cannot be determined from the testimony. However
one thing is certain. Schley as manager of the syndicate
held enough common stock to constitute a controlling in- 
1 Piterest. The stock did not lay idle; syndicate members
used it as collateral to borrow money from Schley who, in
turn, used the same collateral to borrow money from banks
19and other sources. y Since the demands of Schley’s
creditors that he substitute a more current collateral
than the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock was the crux of his 
20problem, both the Senate Committee and the Stanley Com­
mittee tried to determine at what value Schley's credit­
ors had accepted the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral 
Schley evaded a direct answer, but said that he calcu­
lated that about 50 per cent was all that he could
tion, pp. 81-91
^ Stanley Hearings, pp. 862, 863, 867.
^Stanley Report-— Minority, p. 5^.
— ■ i n fYi in—  m— rynf—imtth- m  w i r m w r n — nrr»nirm-n— r— —— n—i— 1 r*-r-
•^ Stanley Hearings, pp. 1095, 1096.
■^Absorption by the United States Steel Corpora-
21average- Using Hanna's figure for the sale price of
the stock, this means that it was worth no more than 65
dollars as security to the banks. Other evidence bears
this figure out. Both Gary and Thorne testified they had
loaned money on the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock at 60 dollars
per share and in the absence of market transactions this
is the best evidence of the probable market value of the 
22stock. But even this value was threatened because
Schley could neither substitute a more creditable asset
for the T.C.I. and B. Co. stock nor extend his maturing
23loans backed by this stock.  ^ His predicament was fur-
p Zi­
ther complicated since many of his debts were call loans, "
subject to call if the collateral that backed them de­
creased in value. Thus if he defaulted on any of his 
loans the stock would have fallen into the hands of his 
creditors who undoubtedly would have offered it for sale 
causing an immediate drop in the price. In turn this
21Ibid., p. 1054.
22Stanley Hearings, pp. 1090-91; Absorption by the 
United Stat¥sBteel Corporation, p. 50; TEe^ITewTork'
Times, June 2, 1911, p* ^ 21 ”
^^The Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
August 12, — —  —
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would have resulted in more pressure from his remaining
25creditors to substitute a better collateral for his loans, v 
Gary's loan on the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock was to 
Schley and the circumstances leading to this loan were a 
continuation of the story which began when Kessler told 
Morgan that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was available for sale. 
When testifying before the Stanley Committee Schley em­
phasized more than any other point the constant demands of 
his creditors that he substitute a more credible asset 
than the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral for his 
loans.^ He recalled that ". . • 7i000,000 dollars worth
of loans were called on us in three days” at the height
27of the Panic by his insistent creditors. r Likewise he
told how he had relayed these demands and prior demands
to the members of the syndicate and of their inability to
28assist because of the worsening business conditions.
Earlier in the fall, Oliver Payne, a former member of the 
Gates syndicate, loaned Schley 8,000,000 dollars of cur­
rent securities, taking uncurrent T.C.I, and R. Co. stocks
29as collateral for the loan. ' Schley continued, recounting 
that it was Payne who suggested to him that he sell the
25Ibid.
Stanley Hearings, pp. 1054-, 1126.
2?Ibid., p. IO54. 28Ibid., p. 1110.
29Ibid., pp. 1078, 1079, 1081.
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T.C.I. and R. Co. stock to the U.S. Steel Corporation and
who offered the services of his lawyer, Lewis Cass Led-
yard, to act as the intermediary with Morgan. After
Ledyard had told Morgan of Schley's problems, the financier
31asked Gary to buy the southern iron and steel company,
Gary refused to consider the sale, but on 23 October loaned 
Schley 1,200,000 dollars, taking 2,000,000 dollars in 
T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral.^
Despite Gary's and Payne's loans, Schley could not 
satisfy the increasing demands of his creditors. Ledyard 
again went to Morgan on 1 November to warn him of Schley’s 
imminent bankruptcy. The financier pressed Gary and 
other company officials to buy the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock. 
Still reluctant, Gary offered Schley a 3 or 6 million 
dollar loan. Schley said that it was insufficient. Gary 
then offered to buy the stock at 90 dollars per share. 
Schley declined, saying that it was insufficient to satisfy 
his creditors. He countered with an offer to sell at a 
figure slightly above the 100 dollar par value of the 
stock.^ Gary accepted this figure and the terms of the
3°Ibid., pp. 1079, 1081. 31rbid., p. 36.
^ Ibid., pp. 65, 1090, 1091.
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 55*
^Stanley Hearings, p. 1123; The New York Times, 
June 2, 19lir’p: 3 7 ----
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1124.
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sale were as follows: each share of T.C.I. and R. Co.
stock was to he exchanged for $119.04 of 5 per cent U.S. 
Steel Corporation^ bonds that currently sold at 84 dol­
lars, and the U.S. Steel Corporation publicly offered to
buy all of the outstanding T.C.I. and R. Co. common stock
37at this figure. r Yet Schley testified that throughout 
these negotiations Gary and Frick, who represented the 
U.S. Steel Corporation, were reluctant about buying the 
stock.
With the exception of 20,000 shares, the entire
issue of the stock was bought within a two week period by
39 «the U.S. Steel Corporation. ' Schley testified that he
immediately used 12,000,000 dollars in bonds to repay some
of his loans, particularly stressing his loan from 
40Kessler. When asked what effect this transaction had on 
the financial community and his firm, he answered that it 
immediately helped to restore confidence in the community 
and make his firm solvent and that 11. . . within 35 days 
Moore and Schley was impregnable.
Neither Schley's testimony nor the testimony of
^Stanley Report— -Majority, p. 187*
37^'Stanley Hearings, p. 67*
^8Ibid., p. 1104.
^^Stanley Report^-Minority, p. 93.
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1089. ^ Ibid. , p. 1095.
45
other witnesses provided any substantive evidence that the 
Morgan interest had aggravated the Panic to gain control 
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. Likewise nothing was introduced 
to prove that U.S. Steel Corporation conspired or for that 
matter intended to acquire the southern iron and steel 
company. If anything, the evidence showed Gary and Prick 
opposed to the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. from 
the beginning and only reluctantly agreeing to it at Mor­
gan’s urgings to prevent Schley*s bankruptcy. While Mor­
gan *s motive in saving Schley at the height of the Panic 
was understandable, questions remain about his motives and 
intentions before this time. Did he relay Kessler*s offer 
to Gary in the spring of 1907 because he wanted to expand 
the U.S. Steel Corporation or because he wanted Gates 
eliminated from the steel industry as he i^anted him elim­
inated from the railroad industry? The failure to call 
Morgan or Kessler as witnesses will leave these questions 
unanswered, perhaps forever. Whatevei' Morgan*s intentions 
were, the purchase of nearly the total issue of the com­
mon stock indicates that more was sought than the elimina­
tion of Gates and the control of the T.C.I. and R. Co. 
since this end could have been accomplished merely by pur­
chasing a majority of the stock. The Commercial and 
Pinancial Chronicle noted that the immediate sale of 
250,000 shares of stock to the U.S. Steel Corporation in­
dicated that this was the amount which actually had been
42used as security for loans and gives credence to Gary's 
testimony that the only reason for the acquisition was to 
prevent Schley's bankruptcy and>the consequent failure of 
his firm.^
On the other hand, evidence existed of the Gates 
syndicate's intent to sell because the syndicate agreement 
specifically authorized Schley to sell if it could be done
iLlL
at a profit. The testimony also showed that the only 
known overtures to sell were made to Gary and Morgan. To 
Gary these overtures were made by persons who he identi­
fied as representatives of the syndicate, and he was not 
asked to further identify them. In Morgan's case the 
overtures came from Kessler and Payne, both former mem­
bers of the syndicate, and creditors of Schley. With its 
usual lack of thoroughness in questioning witnesses, the 
Stanley Committee failed to probe why Morgan and Gary 
were the only people contacted as prospective buyers.
The failure to produce evidence or attempt to pro­
duce evidence that other potential buyers were considered, 
aside from Morgan or the U.S. Steel Corporation, does 
little to discredit a hypothetical supposition that Gates
42Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 9, 
1907, p. 1179.
^ The New York Times, June 2, 1911, p* 3*
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attempted, to accomplish with the combination of the south- 
ern steel and iron companies the same predatory but 
pi'ofitable financial operation that Jiad worked so well 
with the railroads.
The details of the sale, the evidence of the 
events leading up to it, and particularly Schley*s evidence 
did not support the attempt of the majority members of the 
Committee to buttress their charge of an illegal intent by 
claiming that Gary deceived Roosevelt when he told him that 
a majority of the T.C.I. and R. Co. was held by an im­
portant financial firm threatened with bankruptcy.
In the first instance the Majority Report claimed
that no one had a majority of the stock in his possession
because it was locked up in the individual strong boxes
of the syndicate members, none of whom had a majority. ^
Under direct questioning Schley was asked how many shares
of the stock he had in his possession. He said he could
not remember. When asked if it was a controlling interest,
he said that it approximated a controlling interest and
when pressed for a more definite answer, he admitted that
Moore and Schley had pledged at least 150,000 shares as
4-6collateral for loans. Yet this figure did not account 
for the 35>?000,000 he had borrowed on the T.C.I. and R.
4-6^Stanley Report-~Majority, p. 180.
—iwiifin hi kit in1 ii im ■■ i if-inin |i i■ in. i ii1 jin pr  i»i ■mm ii» im i» i »i»' rfii«n*m i i > rr~ in i m* 9 **"
^Stanley Hearings, pp. 1095, 1096.
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Co. stock. f Another indication of Schley’s control is 
the speed at which the transaction was completed. After 
Ledyard visited Morgan on 1 November, the terms of the 
sale were agreed upon within three days except for Roose­
velt* s acquiescence. No evidence or testimony showed that 
any other member of the syndicate or stockholder, aside 
from Schley, was contacted to approve the sale or its 
terms.
In the second instance, the claim of the Majority
Report that Gary deceived Roosevelt about the collapse of
an important New York firm was actually two contentions.
The first was that it was not the brokerage house of Moore
and Schley that was in danger of failing but only Grant
48Schley, its senior partner. Since Moore and Schley was
a partnex*ship, however, disassociating Schley's liability
from the firm in v/hich he was the senior partner would
49have been difficult. His testimony indicated that there 
was no such disassociation. Although he stated that Moore 
and Schley owned not a single share of T.C.I. and R. Co. 
stock, he was just as definite in telling the Committee 
how the sale of this stock caused money to flow into his 
"boxes" and that "within 35 days Moore and Schley was
47Ibid., p. 1049.
^Stanley Report-— Majority, p. 193*
^The New York Times, November 23» 1917* P* H«
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SOimpregnable.
The second contention, that Gary was inaccurate
when he described it as an important firm, depended upon
the perspective of the people who were trying to stem the
Panic in 1907 and those who were investigating it in 1911
and 1912. To Morgan and his associates who were trying
to contain the Panic, perhaps the failure of any concern
would have been important. To the majority members of
the Stanley Committee Moore and Schley was only a broker- 
51age firm.- And the narrative of the majority report 
refers to ,!his [Schley’s] loans aggregating 38,000,000,”-^ 
which disagrees with Schley's direct and uncontested testi­
mony in v/hich he identifies the loans as Moore and 
55Schley's.  ^ One method of evaluating the relative judgment
of Morgan and the majority members of the Stanley Committee
is to note that Schley's or Moore and Schley's indebtedness
came within a half million dollars of being equal to the
total value of the physical assets of the T.C.I. and R.
Co. as listed in the iron and steel company's current
54annual financial statement.
50 , p. 1089
51 Majority, p. 193
^Ibid., p. 192. ^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1088.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 18, 19071
p. 1179.
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The majority members of the Stanley Committee also
attempted to elicit testimony from individual members of
the syndicate that they had been coerced into selling 
55their s t o c k . O n l y  Gates, while admitting that he sold 
his stock, said that it was a forced sale. He added that 
if it had been put on the market it would have gotten a 
higher price. In direct contradiction both Hanna and
56Schley testified that no market existed for the stock.
Immediately after the U.S. Steel Corporation offered to
buy the stock, it became unpegged and dropped to 101 dol-
57lars per s h a r e . T h e  discrepancy in Gates' statement 
about the forced sale is that he did not have to sell the 
stock unless it was under control of the syndicate mana­
ger, Schley, and only then according to the syndicate
58agreement, if it could be sold at a profit. What stood 
out in Gates' testimony was that although he said it was 
a forced sale, under direct questioning by both majority 
and minority members of the Committee he did not or could
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 64. The Report 
quotes the evidence ojTlsEe members of the Gates syndi­
cate. Stanley Hearings, pp. 10, 14 gives Gates' evidence.
^Stanley Report— Minoxuty, p. 54; Wall Street 
Journal, August 3T^l5Tl~P„ 5~-
"^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 9,
1907, p. 1T52.
"^ Stanley Report-~Hiriority, p. 51; The New York 
Times, Hay 28, 1911, p. 1;"Stanley Hearings, p. 14.
51
not name the person or agency who forced the sale*
Failing in this line of questioning to produce any 
evidence of coercion, the majority members of the Stanley 
Committee insisted that the U.S. Steel Corporation had 
used the Panic to acquire an asset of great value. Claim­
ing that "The value of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co.'s 
stock is the crux of the whole controversy," the Majority 
Report said that if the stock was only worth 35 or 40 
millions to the U.S. Steel Corporation then it had no 
motive in refusing to relieve the necessity of Schley with­
out his surrender of the stock in this company. On the 
other hand, if the existence of this firm threatened the 
supremacy of the U.S. Steel Corporation in the south and 
if its vast holdings were worth more than the price paid, 
the U.S. Steel Corporation was the beneficiary of Schley’s 
predie ament.^
From this premise the Committee introduced evi­
dence to demonstrate that the true value of the T.C.I. and 
R. Co. was greatly in excess of its capitalization. For 
the present it will only be necessary to say that this 
evidence was that the T.C.I. and R. possessed 700*000,000 
to 1,000,000,000 tons of iron ore. However, the Committee 
did not fix the value of this ore and therefore did not
59^ Stanley Hearings, p. 14.
^ S t a n l e y  R e p o r t - - M a j o r i t y , p p .  1 9 5 - 9 0 .
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attempt to solve the "crux” of the problem. The purpose 
of introducing the premise was not stated, but it is evi­
dent that the Committee majority wished to demonstrate 
that the illicit intentions of the U.S. Steel Corporation 
had been consummated by acquiring a corporation possessing 
huge mineral resources.
What is significant about the Committee's unan­
swered speculation about the true value of the stock is 
that later writers have concentrated on the advantageous 
price paid for the stock by the U.S. Steel Corporation.
But the Majority Report made no allegation that the price 
paid for the stock itself was low, since it had gone to
great lengths to explain that it was pegged artificially
61high to keep it out of the hands of speculators.
The conclusion of the section in the Majority 
Report dealing with the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Go. 
bore down heavily on one contention: that the U.S. Steel
Corporation could have avoided the absorption of the
62T.C.I. and R. Co. by loaning Schley 6 million dollars.
But the Report failed to note that both Schley's and 
Cary's evidence showed that Schley refused a loan for this 
exact amount from Cary. This statement, like the allega­
tion that there had been an intent to violate the Sherman 
Anti-trust Act,; is contradicted or not supported by the
61Ibid., p. 190. 62Ibid.. p. 194.
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available evidence. The singular gap in the testimony, 
the failure to call Morgan as a witness, must be borne by 
the majority members of the Stanley Committee. Likewise 
the charge that Roosevelt had been duped by Gary rests 
more on what is meant by the semantics of phrases like 
“control of a majority of the stock" or "important New 
York firm" than on the evidence produced. The rational­
ization that produced these charges is typified by the 
claim in the Majority Report that "If the Steel Corpora­
tion could have absorbed the Tennessee Coal and Iron . . . 
without violation of the existing law it would not have 
been necessary for Judge Gary, on a special car, rigged
up at midnight, to make that hurried run to Washington or
63to confer with the President before breakfast. ” **
65Ibid., p. 208.
CHAPTER IV
THE T.C.I. AND R. CO. ACQUISITION FROM 
AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT
Although the intent and conspiracy charges appear 
to be without foundation, there remained the contention 
that the U.S. Steel Corporation's purchase of the T.C.I. 
and R. Co. had created a combination that was in violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by economic standards alone. 
This was a difficult undertaking since the Act contained 
no such standards. The most practical approach to this 
problem was taken by the Stanley Committee v/hich recom­
mended that the Act be rewritten to specify that control 
of a given percentage of the market would be evidence that 
restraint of trade existed. But even this definition 
would have been ex post facto to the events surrounding 
the merger of 1907-
The nature of the complaints against the merger 
were that the U.S. Steel Corporation had by the acquisi­
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co. enhanced its already pre­
dominant control of the nation's iron ore resources, and 
that the absorption of this company eliminated a competi­
tor whose natural advantages in the production of pig iron 
and open-hearth steel threatened the markets and capital
54
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investments of the U.S. Steel Corporation*
The Majority Report of the Stanley Committee and 
the Justice Department's suit claimed that the U.S. Steel 
Corporation exercised a monopoly control over the iron ore
Stanley Committee Majority Report relied on the Bureau of 
Corporations Report on the Steel Industry which, it said,
of course, was not quite true because the Bureau of Corpor­
ations in its report had said that the corporation was not 
a monopoly, although it had hedged this statement by saying 
that it showed monopolistic tendencies in regard to iron 
ore. Specifically, the Bureau of Corporations Report said
that the U.S. Steel Corporation acquired ore lands in ad-
2vance of needs and that its rate of profit on its ore 
railroads, which also hauled other companies' ore, was 
excessively high.^ The Department of Justice's suit con­
tended that the U.S. Steel Corporation had greatly 
strengthened its control of the iron ore of the country 
by the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. Further, it 
stated that it had . . b y  the locking up of raw
supply of the United States. To support this claim, the
had condemned the corporation for this monopoly.^ This,
p
Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 381
ii wu i iBf ■■ n  n m  h i — mi I III >1II ii ■■ »i.n iw naii ~ftim i ■■■■ i i n i  mu ii m i ni > m n  i ■ i rn i i . n. i i i fTT r r in .» w i t i h -  •
^Ibidc , p. 374-*
^The Hew York Times, October 27, 1911, p. 2.
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materials . . ." prevented, their use by competitors. 
Actiially the Bureau of Corporations Report, which ante­
dated the suit of the Department of Justice and the Stanley 
Report, produced the headline catching statistic that the 
U.S. Steel Corporation controlled 75 per cent of the iron 
ore resources in the Great Lakes area.
The impact of this figure on the reading public of 
the time is hard to judge. What is certain is that people 
like Bryan and the majority members of the Stanley Commit­
tee, who were attempting to lead public opinion were saying 
that the federal government should prevent any single in­
dustrial combination from owning or controlling more than 
a specified percentage of an industry. Bryan proposed a
7
figure of 50 per cent in 1906. The Majority Report of 
the Stanley Committee set the figure at 30 per cent in
o
1912. While Bryan's proposal was a simple statement, un­
cluttered with details that might impede quick acceptance, 
the legislative recommendation of the Stanley Committee 
v/as necessarily more precise and therefore perhaps less 
easily understood. It recommended that if a corporation 
or association was charged i^ ith restraint of trade,
^Ibid.
6Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 380.
^The New York Times, September 16, 1906, p. 1. 
^Stanley Report— Majority, p. 214.
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presumption of unreasonable restraint should exist if the
organization controlled more than 30 per cent of the total
quantity of an article sold in the United States or in
9any part of the country. Clearly, as with the Sherman 
Act, the Stanley Committee would leave the determination 
of what was a monopoly to the courts. It is also clear 
that what the Bureau of Corporations Report was talking 
about was total resources when it used a figure of 75 per 
cent, whereas the Stanley Committee was talking about con­
trolling the amount sold. Since the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion was not a seller of iron ore and was dependent on in­
dependent sources for pig iron,^ very little judicial 
interpretation would have been needed to place the U.S. 
Steel Corporation's purported monopoly or monopolistic 
tendencies beyond the pale of the Stanley Committee's 30 
per cent limitation. However, the courts were not con­
fronted with this particular problem since Congress never 
acted on the report's recommendation.
For unaccountable reasons the Bureau of Corpora­
tions did not evaluate the effect of the T.C.I. and R. 
acquisition on the ore position of the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion. This may be accounted for by the statement in the 
Report that the iron and steel industry of the United
^Ibid., p. 214.
^Stanley Report— -Minority, p. 92; Bureau of 
Corporations eel Investigation, File Numbe'r~™?6l2™i- 4 ~ 2,
— ■ i him ■n%in i i i  inir>nniT-in nr «  11 ■■ 11 n 11 rn  i  i r r in wrrtgr r 1 r i 1 it —f i r r y  r-—1  ..... ...  m " l-m r  ■ m m .w .  *
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11States is based on the Lake District ore deposits. This 
rationale is somewhat supported by the cursory treatment 
that the T.C.I. and R. Co. and the Birmingham district 
received.
A questionable aspect of the Majority Report of 
the Stanley Committee, the Bureau of Corporations Report 
and the Justice Department's brief in the Steel suit is 
the unexplained failure to use the U.S. Geological Survey's 
figures where available to determine total ore deposits and 
ownership of these deposits. Instead, the figures of an 
array of state tax commissions, company mining engineers, 
and mining engineers whose credentials were not identified 
were applied to both the Lake District and Birmingham 
District without a standard criteria of assay value being 
mentioned. Working with evidence presented to the Stanley 
Committee, and perhaps in an attempt to find what might 
have been a non-controversial answer, the minority members 
of the Stanley Committee took the high figures for the 
total ore possessed or leased by the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion in the Lake District and the low figures for the total
12resources of the same district. The Majority Report's 
use of figures from the financial pages of New York papers 
to estimate the total ore reserves of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
■^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 378, 
12oj 1 ___ -o .x. -Minority, p. SO.
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predictably produced greater resources than any other 
source.  ^ This probably resulted from the rash of arti­
cles dealing with the T.C.I. and R. Co. that were pub­
lished when Gates was attempting to put together his
14southern combination.
If the figures of the Geological Survey and the 
engineers of the Geological Survey are used to portray the 
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the ore resources in 
the Lake District and the Birmingham District, there is a 
significant difference in the percentage under the corpora­
tion's control. However, there is a gap in the Geological 
Survey's figures. They do not show the ore resources owned 
or leased in the Lake District by the various corporations. 
Therefore the Bureau of Corporations used the figures pro­
vided by the companies themselves and these figures were 
not challenged by the Stanley Committee or by the Depart­
ment of Justice. Since these represent the highest esti­
mate given of the Corporation's resources in the Lake 
District, their use to recompute the percentage of control 
will eliminate any suggestion that the reevaluation is 
biased in favor of the U.S. Steel Corporation. The use of 
any other figures for the U.S. Steel Corporation’s hold­
ings in the Lake District will decrease its percentage of
13■'Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 196-98.
—  ainiiT ■ ■ m n i M i m r n w . i  i. imf ■ i m n n n i  w u m . i w   ..........   ir%r»».i.ii n«»rii n i "  “  “ ■
■^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 3.1, 1906, 
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LEASED BY THE U.S. STEEL CORPORATION IN THE BIRMINGHAM 

















District 358,000,000 131,000,000 37%
Total 3,858,000,000 1,631,000,000 43%
^Bureau of Corporations Reports Part I, p. 380; 
Stanley Repor^-Flinority, p. 76. ^e' Geological Survey
figures and the UTS. Steel Corporation figures for the 
Lake District are in the Bureau of Corporations Report. 
The Geological Survey figures for T.C.I. and R. Co. and 
the U.S. Steel Corporation in the Birmingham District are 
cited in the Stanley Report.
control.
Using the Geological Survey figures, the Corpora­
tion's percentage of control is considerably lower than the 
spectacular 75 per cent figiire given in the Bureau of Cor­
porations Report (See Table I). If the extent of monopoly 
was to be determined by a percentage figure as recommended 
by the Stanley Committee Report, the acquisition of the 
Birmingham District ores by the U.S. Steel Corporation did 
nothing to enhance the Corporation's monopoly position.
The allegation in the Department of Justice's suit that the 
Corporation had locked up the nation's ore resources can be 
questioned on other grounds.
Although the statistics used by the Bureau of 
Corporations to determine ore resources were not derived 
from consistent sources and were also fragmentary in places, 
the statistics regarding production were systematically 
gathered and present a coherent picture of the U.S. Steel 
Corporation's relative position in the iron and steel in­
dustry. In the years from 1901 through 1909 the annual
average iron ore production of the Corporation was 45 per
*1
cent of the national figure. The high figure in this
average was 46.3 per cent in 1908 and the low, 43 per cent,
17occurred in 1903. The coincidence between the production 
percentage and ore control percentage of the U.S. Steel
16Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 366.
1hbid.
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Corporation when using the Geological Survey's figures for 
total resources did not indicate that Corporation was 
locking up its resources.
On the other hand, the U.S. Steel Corporation 
claimed that its resources were being used faster than any 
other steel corporation. Edwin Eckels, the Corporation's 
Chief Mining Engineer, writing in 1912, claimed that at
i
the previously experienced annual rate of usage, the Cor­
poration's ore deposits would be exhausted in 55 years.
In the same tabulation he indicated that the ore resources
1 o
of the Bethlehem Steel Company would last for 785 years.
The Minority Report of the Stanley Committee made the same 
claim, noting that the Corporation's acquisition of raw 
materials had not kept pace with its expanding steel pro­
duction. It also said that the Corporation's ore supply,
at the present rate of production, would not last for 
19forty years. Without going into the subject further, 
the Bureau of Corporations Report said that it was appar­
ently the policy of the Corporation to secure ore resources
20we11 advance of requirements. A factor which undoubtedly 
promoted an aggressive policy in acquiring ore lands was
^Edwin C. Eckels, "Iron Ore Reserves," The 
Engineering Magazine, Vol. 43 (August 1912), pp.~”4"71“73.
^Stanley Report--Minority, p. 92.
20Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 381.
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the contemporary concern that the rapid expansion of the 
steel industry would exhaust domestic iron ore resources 
by the 1950's.*^
What stands out in regard to the controversy over 
the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. and its ore re­
sources is that when percentage figures were quoted in re­
gard to monopolistic control by the U.S. Steel Corporation, 
only the Lake District and the Birmingham District were 
considered. No attempt was made to compare the ore hold­
ings of the U.S. Steel Corporation against the total re­
sources of the country. Let us assume that Roosevelt, 
prior to “not interposing any objections” to the acquisi­
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co., had asked the U.S. Geolog­
ical Survey engineers to give an opinion as to what degree 
this acquisition would increase the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion^ percentage of the total national resources. The 
U.S. Geological Survey would have given the President the
information that was subsequently included in government 
22reports and the testimony that was given to the Stanley 
25Committee. ^ Then the following would have been given to
^ The Stanley Hearings, pp. 24-90-92; The Stanley
Report— -Minority, p. 92; U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of 
^fclieSational Resources Commission, S. Doc. 676, VolT^THy
sss., p. 520.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the National 
Resources Commission, S. Doc. 676, Vol. ITl, 653th Cong. ,
2T^eis7TTn5SD7“
25■'Stanley Report— -Minority,-.p.- 76.n m  mm iTTr«i in ■ i>— n iiW iiw M iiw  iiimi pi mi iw~im mi run n rm i nt"!.  i *
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the President: (See Table II)
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OP THE U.S. STEEL CORPORATION'S 
CONTROL OP TOTAL U.S. IRON ORE RESOURCES BEPORE 
AND APTER THE ACQUISITION OP THE 
T.C.I. AND R. CO.
Total U.S. Iron Ore Resources 4,788,000,000 tons
Per cent of U.S. 
Resources Con­
trolled by U.S. 
Steel Corpora­
tion
Total Owned, or Leased 
by U.S. Steel Cor­
poration Prior to Ac­
quisition of T.C.I.
and R. Co. 1,500,000,000 tons 32%
Ore Resources gained 
by U.S. Steel Cor­
poration by Acquisi­
tion of T.C.I. and R.
Co. 131,000,000 tons
Total 1,631,000,000 tons 34%
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A basic contention of the Stanley Committee Major­
ity Report was that Roosevelt never considered the extent 
of the raw material holdings of the T.C.I. and R. and the 
effects of these holdings upon the steel industry. It is 
quite probable that he did not consider the ore holdings 
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. His testimony does not indicate 
that he did, nor was he questioned by the Committee on 
the matter. But it is apparent that if he had consulted 
the Geological Survey, he would have found the acquisition 
of T.C.I. and R. Co. would have only added 2 per'cent to 
the U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the total national 
resources and, as noted in Table II, there was no increase 
in percentage if only the country’s two main ore producing 
areas, the Lake District and the Birmingham District were 
taken together. In any case the percentage of increase 
did not exceed the 4- or 5 per cent that Roosevelt testi­
fied that Gary had said would be the amount by which the 
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the steel industry
would be enhanced by the purchase of the T.C.I. and R.
„ 24-Co.
The concern about the relative and absolute size 
of the U.S. Steel Corporation by the Bureau of Corpora­
tions, the Stanley Committee, and the Justice Department 
was perhaps representative of a large segment of public
66
opinion that believed that trust problems could be solved 
by simply redefining monopoly in terms of the percentage of 
the market or resources that a corporation held. The mere 
size of the U.S. Steel Corporation seemed to hypnotize the 
people who were investigating it. The Bureau of Corpora­
tions Report, v/hich was published in July, 1911, said that 
one of the monopolistic aspects of the Corporation was the 
previously mentioned high rate of return on capital in­
vested in the ore railroads, which, through high freight 
rates for hauling ore could prevent new competition or drive 
established competition out. When Gates was testifying be­
fore the Stanley Committee in May of the same year, the 
Chairman reminded Gates of the coercive pov/er that the U.S. 
Steel Corporation could exercise over his iron and steel 
interests because of its possession of the ore railroads.
But Gates explained to Congressman Stanley that the Cor­
poration could exercise no such coercive power as long as
25
the Interstate Commerce Commission did its job.
Corporation held a monopoly or tended to monopolistic con­
trol of the iron ore resources is that it failed to demon­
strate the effects of monopoly. That is that a monopolis­
tic price structure existed or that competition was stif­
led. On the contrary, the Bureau of Corporations Report 
said that competition had thrived despite the predominant
The main weakness in the charge that the U.S. Steel
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pr
position of the corporation in the iron ore resources,
Moving up the ladder of production, the next
charge against the U.S. Steel Corporation was that its
motive for absorbing the T.C.I. and R. Co, was to gain a
cheap source of pig iron and prevent this source from com-
27peting with its more expensive product. r Although neither 
the Department of Justice*s suit or the Bureau of Corpora­
tions Report made this point, the Majority Report of the 
Stanley Committee pressed it in great detail. The sub­
stance of the argument was that the closeness of the sup-
28posedly cheaper non-Bessemer ores to the coal fields in 
the Birmingham District gave this area a distinct cost ad­
vantage over other parts of the country in the production
of pig iron and therefore in the production of open-hearth
29steel which could be made from non-Bessemer ores. The 
Majority Report of the Stanley Committee offered no data 
or evidence to support its statement that the non-Bessemer 
ores of the Birmingham District v/ere cheaper than the ores 
of the Lake District. An analysis of ore costs in the 
Bureau of Corporations Report shows a different picture. 
Averaging the at-the-mine costs of ore for the years 1902- 
1906, it lists the cost of Birmingham District ore at 73
^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 377* 
^Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 159-166.
^ I b i d . , p .  1 6 0 .  ^ I b i d . , p p .  163> 1 6 7 *
50cents per ton and Lake District ore at r/8 cents per ton.
Since the iron content of the Lake District ore was ap­
proximately 15 per cent greater than the Birmingham 
51District ore, the cost differential was actually in favor 
of the northern ores.
On the surface it would have seemed that the close­
ness of the iron and coal deposits in the Birmingham Dis­
trict would have given this area a distinct advantage over 
other pig iron manufacturing sections of the country. De­
spite the numerous witnesses that the Majority Report cited 
to prove the relative advantage of the Birmingham District
in producing pig iron, only Gates expressed the comparative
52advantage in dollars and cents. He told the Committee
that the cost of manufacturing pig iron in the Birmingham
District was 9 dollars a ton, hut that anywhere else in the
55country it would cost at least 11 dollars a ton. Gates'
estimate of the cost of making pig iron outside of the
Birmingham District was approximately confirmed by the
Bureau of Corporations Report's average of $11*82 per ton
54-for pig iron made from Lake ores. Howevei4, the cost data
^ Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, pp. 50>51. 
^Vance, Human Geography, p. $02.
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for pig iron manufacture in the books of the T.C.I. and R.
Co. showed the average cost to this company as $11.02 per
ton.^ James Bacon, President of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
until its takeover by the Gates syndicate, estimated the
company’s pig iron production cost at between 10 and 11
36dollars a ton.
Prom the evidence so far introduced, it appears 
that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had a definite advantage in the 
manufacture of pig iron, and that the only question that 
could be asked is how great the advantage was. As recently 
as 1969, Melvin Urofsky, in discussing the motives behind 
the U.S. Steel Corporation’s acquisition of the T.C.I. and 
R. Co., noted the approximately 2 dollar differential be­
tween the Birmingham District and other iron manufacturing
Districts cited in the Stanley Report as a reason for the
37purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. However, this advan­
tage quickly disappears when all the evidence given to the 
Stanley Committee is considered.
Leonard Hanna told the Committee that there was 
scarcely any market in the south for the company's pig
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 48.
^ I b i d . ^  p. 4.3#
37Melvin I. Urofsky, Big Steeland the Wilson 
Administration (Columbus, Ohio: (TKTo^Btate^TTniversity 
tress, 1 9 6 9 ) , 2 2 .
70
38iron* John Topping, President of the T.C.I* and P. Co.
at the time it was purchased by the U.S. Steel Corporation,
said that 75 cent of the company’s pig iron had to be
39sold in northern markets.^ Schley stated that Gates and
Hanna did not consider T.C.I. and R. Co. a true competitor
of northern companies since freight rates as high as $4.60
40would keep it out of these markets. Unfortunately none
of the agencies that investigated the steel industry
analyzed the effect of freight rates on the extent of the
market. Nor, aside from one year, 1907, are there any
figures on the prices that the T.C.I. and R. Co« received
for its pig iron. In that year the average price was
41$16.49 per ton. Nevertheless, some idea of the problems 
of marketing southern pig iron in the northern markets are 
apparent from the monthly price quotations published in 
The Iron Age, the principal trade Journal of the iron and 
steel industry. If the freight rate of $4.60 per ton 
specified by Schley for moving Birmingham District pig iron 
to the north is added to the T.C.I. and R. Co.'s cost for 
producing one ton of pig iron, $11.02, the combined cost 
was $15-62. Logically, then, Birmingham District pig iron
38  ^ 39 ^Stanley Report— Minority, p. 49- Ibid.
w . urii i r .  .* iai-  inr  -■■■ i. n r » n f  imwu n i iii liiii mi.....  m m* ■ <n—n »iw ii i- iV n i " t n H B w n r n M
40Senate Investigation, p. 48.
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 49.
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could have only moved profitably into the northern market
when the price of pig iron exceeded $15*62 in northern
markets. Using the monthly average figures for the 60
months comprising the years 1905-1909, there were 51 months
42in which the northern market price exceeded $15.62, or 
stated another way, the T.C.I. and R. Co. could have only 
sold pig iron in the northern market 51 per cent of the 
time during this 60 month period at a price above produc­
tion and transportation costs. But these were prosperous 
times for the iron and steel industry* The pig iron prices 
were higher than they had been since the 18801s  ^ or would
/} h
be again until the late months of 1916. In each of the 
years from the beginning of 1905 until the end of 1908, 
there were months in which the prices were high enough to 
promote a northward flow of pig iron. There v/ere less 
favorable years.
In 1904 there was only one month in which the price 
was above $15.64 per ton and in 1911 the price never rose 
above $13*75* These figures indicate that the T.C.I. and R.
42 "Iron and Steel Prices for Twenty-One Years," The 
Iron Age, January, 1920, Vol. 105, p. 52.
^Frank A. Pearson and George F. Warren, Prices 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935), p. 3/l*
^"Iron and Steel Prices for Twenty-One Years," The 
Iron Age, January, 1920, Vol. 105, p. 52.
Co.* s pig iron could only compete outside the southern 
region when prices were above average and from this stand­
point, the possession of this company would confer none of 
the advantages of monopoly, at least not on national scale 
If a monopoly in pig iron existed in the South merely by 
the possession of this company, then it must have existed 
prior to the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. 
Steel Corporation. But this was not suggested by either 
the Bureau of Corporations Report or the Majority or Minor 
ity sections of the Stanley Report. Likewise, no evidence 
was produced to show that the U.S. Steel Corporation was 
engaged in monopolistic practices in the South. Perhaps 
Gates, a witness who was certainly not friendly to the 
U.S. Steel Corporation, provided the best evidence to 
refute the allegation that the Corporation had used its 
power to enforce monopolistic conditions. When asked how 
the U.S. Steel Corporation*s monopolistic control in the 
South affected his company, he denied that it existed,
pointing out that his company, the Republic Steel Company,
45sold 50 per cent of the ore it mined to other companies.
To a similar question regarding pig iron, he replied that 
he had no problem competing with the T.C.I. and R. Co.
When Stanley attempted to draw Gates out on the threats 
that the U.S. Steel Corporation had used, Gates replied
45 4 5^Stanley Hearings, p. 53* Ibid., p. 19*
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that nobody in the U.S. Steel Corporation would make such 
threats and that if they did, nobody would believe them.^ 
Moving up from pig iron to the highest stage of 
manufacture, open-hearth steel, the final allegation was 
that U.S. Steel Corporation had absorbed a competitor that 
threatened its position as the nation’s largest steel pro­
ducer. The substance of this claim was that the T.C.I. 
and R. Co.'s manufacture of open-hearth steel with non- 
Bessemer ores would break, as the Majority Report of the 
Stanley Committee phrased it, "the perfect and hitherto
seemingly invincible control of steel products” by the
48U.S. Steel Corporation. The Department of Justice in
>
its brief said that the Corporation had shown a desire to
acquire a company that had recently assumed a position of
49great significance. On the other hand, the Bureau of 
Corporations Report, while discussing the technical and 
economic reasons for the rise of open-hearth steel pro­
duction in all the steel producing areas of the country, 
did not attach any particular advantage to this develop­
ment in the South, nor comment on a relationship between 
this development and the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R.
^ Ibid., p. 54-.
48Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 160-161.
^Rew York Times, October 27, 1911* P* 1*
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Co.5°
The sweeping language of the Stanley Committee 
Majority Report was based on that assumption that the 
T.C.I. and S. Co. had made a technical breakthrough that 
enabled it to produce a steel that was cheaper or of a bet­
ter quality than the product of the U.S. Steel Corpora- 
51tion. Therefore, since the U.S. Steel Corporation only 
possessed Bessemer ore and production facilities to convert 
this type of ore into Bessemer steel, its huge capital in-
52
vestments were threatened by the T.C.I. and R. Co. This
picture was pieced together in the Majority Report by the
omission of facts and a contrived patching of snatches of
evidence that was obviously intended to leave the reader
with the impression that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was already
a major producer of open-hearth steel while the U.S. Steel
Corporation was irrevocably committed to maintaining its
55Bessemer supremacy.^
The statistics of the Bureau of Corporations Report 
show a completely contradictory picture. The U.S. Steel 
Corporation in the year of its founding, 1901, produced 
2,747,000 tons of open-hearth steel or 99 per cent of the
Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, pp. 304,
570, 373, 5 W :
^Stanley Report*— Majority, pp. 157-01.
g  — r~r'~*f *—■Til 11" '■ ■ —' ' *  »  'r ' ■ — inn iimm nw ■ i  i
52Ibid., pp. 167, 169, 174-, 176. 55Ibid.
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national output.^ By 1906, the year before the acquisi­
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co., the Corporation's produc­
tion had increased to 5?543,000 tons, but its share of the
56total output had declined to 49 per cent. ^ In contrast to
this, the total steel output of the T.C.I. and R. Co. in
1907 was only 243,440 tons^ which was only 2.1 per cent of
the national open-hearth production. It is also noteworthy
57that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was booked to capacity in 1907 
and that the total expansion planned and advertised by the 
Gates syndicate would have only raised the total'steel pro­
duction capacity to 600,000 tons a year by 1910.^ More­
over, unskilled labor and inefficient management methods
caused the cost of steel manufacturing to be higher in the
59Birmingham District than the northern d i s t r i c t s . I n  
fact the T.C.I. and R. Co. sold 146,000 tons of steel rails
^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
50, p. $60.
55Ibid. , p. 362. 56Ibid. . also Ta-bie 28, p. 238.
^ Stanley Report— Majority, p. 173.
^®Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1907, p. 2.
^See Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, 
p. 550 for comparative cost analysi"sT£~Tance, Human Geo­
graphy, p. 305, cites the problem of unskilled labor in 
Southern steel mills; Tarbell, Gary, p. 310, cites Gary's 
demand that the T.C.I. and R. Co. terminate Its contract 
for prison labor, quoting his repugnance to the customary 
use of the whipping post as a means of supervision.
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in 1907 at a loss of 72 cents per ton.^
When the small steel production of the T.C.I. and 
R. Co. and the limited plans for its expansion are con­
trasted to the open-hearth production of the U.S. Steel 
Corporation, it is difficult to see how the small company 
could be a threatening competitor. It is more difficult 
when it is considered that when the T.C.I. and R. Co. was 
purchased in 1907, the U.S. Steel Corporation was building 
a steel plant at Gary, Indiana that would have an annual
open-hearth capacity of 3 ,750,000 tons or six times the
61projected annual capacity of the T.C.I. and R. Co. The 
failure of the Majority Report of the Stanley Committee 
to comment on internal expansion as extensive as this 
while concentrating its attention on the acquisition of 
such a small producer as the T.C.I. and R. Co. can only 
lead to the conclusion that it was either misguided or 
that the object of its investigation was something other 
than the specter of monopoly. The same can also be said 
for the significance that the Department of Justice saw 
in the absorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
As with the previous charges, what is striking 
about the open-hearth monopoly allegation is the failure
60Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table 
28, p. 239; Stanley Report— Minority," p. 49.
^ 1 Gary: The Largest and Most Modern Steel Works 
in Existence,” Scientific American, December, 1909, Vol. 
101, pp. 441-45.
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to show the effects of monopoly; to show that competitors 
had been forced to leave the field or that a monopoly 
price had been exacted. The iron and steel price data in 
the Minority Report of the Stanley Committee is computed 
on a national basis, merely reflecting the cyclic de­
cline of iron and steel prices that began in the middle of 
1907 and continued through 1912 when the Stanley Report 
was published. No explanation is given in the Minority 
Report for the drop in prices after 1907* The Bureau of 
Corporations Report, touching on the matter of prices very 
lightly, says that while the costs of production remained 
remarkably stable, prices always fluctuated with market 
conditions. v At the bottom of the cyclic trough in prices 
in 1911 when a ton of steel was ten dollars cheaper than 
it was in 19075 "tke financial writers attributed the low
prices to the competition brought about by numerous pro-
64ducers and expanded capacity. In spite of this glut of 
production, the U.S. Steel Corporation was forced to de­
fend itself against the operations of pools by securing
65options and buying pig iron from independent producers. ^
urea
-Minority, pp. 84-90. 
r Corporations Report, Part III, p. 8.
Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation. Pile 
2612-4-2, RG 122.
^The New York Times, November 14, 1910, p. 3*
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Nor is there any evidence that the Corporation was the
price leader. On the contrary, the available accounts
of the price movements show that it followed the trend set
66by the independents. An exception to the statement that 
prices folloi^ed market conditions is the fixed price of 
steel rails which remained at 28 dollars per ton through 
the years 1902-1912 according to the historical statistics 
of the United States.^ It may be that this was a purely 
coincidental average since it was not offered as evidence 
of price fixing by either the Department of Justice's 
brief or the agencies that investigated the steel industry 
and the U.S. Steel Corporation. However, the previously 
cited sales price of rails for the T.C.I. and R. Co. in 
1907 and a contract for future delivery of rails by the 
same company at 30 dollars per ton indicate that there 
were variations in price. An interesting sidelight to 
the price issue is that the leaders of the steel industry, 
Gary, Carnegie, and Perkins, recommended in their
66Bureau of Corporations, Steel Investigation,
Pile N u m b e F ^ ^ - I ' - T - ' 2 7 ' H ^ r 2 7 --------'----- ----
^Social Research Council, The Statistical History 
of the United States from Colonial TTme^to~tIie present
X B taE ro rH 7**^o^5ectrcu^T T !a3!i^Ie IH ~ IirD r£sE ers7~Tnc77~T9^5) »
Series E 101-112, p. 123-
68Stanley Report— Hajority, pp. 174-75.
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testimony to the Stanley Committee that the federal govern­
ment control steel prices. Carnegie even recommended that
the government determine the price of all goods sold in
69interstate commerce. Branding these suggestions as
socialistic, the Majority Report firmly rejected them as
70unconstitutional.
No evidence was presented that the absorption of
the T.C.I. and R. Co. drove other competitors from the
field. The only complaint in the Bureau of Corporations’
files against the Corporation is a single stockholder's pro-
71test that cash reserves had been invested in securities.'
Likewise the Department of Justice's suit was seriously
embarrassed when competitors who were called as government
72witnesses, in fact, became witnesses for the defense.'
Actually the issuance of the Stanley Report in
August, 1912, was an obituary notice for the acquisition
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. as a public issue. Although Bryan
attempted to revive it during the presidential campaign 
that year, he was quite alone.
The question remains about how much the acquisi­
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co. increased the control of
^Stanley Hearings, pp. 234, 627, 1128.
^ Stanley Report-~Majority, p. 211.
71f Bureau of Corporations, Steel Investigation,
Rile Number 1908-1-1-3,
72( Donald Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, i93*J77~P*'~^34.
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the U.So Steel Corporation over the iron and steel in- 
dustry of the United States. Aside from the multitude of 
estimates on the iron ore resources of the U.S. Steel 
Corporation and the T.C.I. and R. Co., none of the agen­
cies v/hich investigated the steel industry and the Corpora­
tion produced any evidence or statistics on the increase 
in capacity that the U.S. Steel Corporation gained as a re­
sult of its purchase of the southern company. The Bureau 
of Corporations Report came the nearest to an estimate of 
this type when it shov;ed growth percentage comparison,
using 1901 as a base year and contrasting it with the
73Corporation's capacity in January, 1911. Although not
showing capacity changes in 1907, it notes that in the ten
year period the Corporation's plant capacity grevi 88 per
cent by internal expansion, but only 30 per cent by ac-
74quisition of other companies.' Since the capacity 
figures are not available, the comparative production and 
percentage figures for 1907 are the only alternative for 
determining to what degree the acquisition increased the 
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the total production. 
Actually in 1907, there was probably very little difference 
between total production and capacity since, as previously
73'^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
29, p. 269.
^ I b i d .
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mentioned, the iron and steel plants were booked to capa­
city during the entire year.
Table III, which was taken from the Bureau of 
Corporations Report, portrays and summarizes the relation­
ship between the total production of the iron and steel
industry in 1907 and both the T.C.I. and R. Co. and the
75U.S. Steel Corporation. ^ The figures for ingots and
castings, being steel in the unfinished condition, are the
76best index of a steel producer's output.f In sum, the 
figures show that Gary's statement to Roosevelt regarding 
the increase in percentage of control that would result 
from the T.C.I. and R. Co. acquisition were well within 
the 4- or 5 pei* cent figure that he stipulated. Likewise 
the figures show the relatively unimportant position the 
T.C.I. and R, Co. held in the American steel industry and 
the unlikelihood that the merging of this company with the 
U.S. Steel Corporation would in itself create a monopoly.
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THE SOURCE OP THE LEGEND
When attention is directed to the relatively small 
size of the T.C.I. and R. Co. compared to the predominant 
position of the U.S. Steel Corporation and the minor 
effect the acquisition had on the larger concern's share 
of the total national steel output and iron ore reserves, 
the continued interest in the matter seems out of pro­
portion to what the facts warrant. This is because the 
controversy was rooted in politics.
Even though the actual acquisition caused almost 
no unfavorable comment, the political reactions that could 
result from the understanding between Roosevelt and Gary 
were a concern to the Administration. When Gary drafted a 
memorandum outlining the terms under which Roosevelt had 
acquiesced in the merger, at Root's request Gary deleted 
the favorable offhand remarks the President made regarding 
the U.S. Steel Corporation.^
Likewise, there were political overtones in Gary's 
omitting to tell Roosevelt the name of the important New 
York concern that faced bankruptcy. Although Schley's
^George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt: 




name or his firm’s name were not mentioned in the press 
either in connection with Gates' efforts to combine the 
Southern steel companies or the sale of the T.C.I. and R. 
Co.5 during the 1894 debate on the sugar tariff in the 
Senate his firm had come under fire when it refused to 
divulge the names of Senators who had accounts with it and
2who were suspected of speculating in sugar company stocks. 
Apparently, the issue had not been forgotten since it was 
the only significant item of public interest mentioned in 
Schley's obituary in 1917*^
A natural assumption is that Gary x/ithheld the name 
because it woxild have been impolitic to have to testify at 
a later date that the President had for any purpose know­
ingly been a party to saving a firm which once had been 
involved in a political scandal* The probability that evi­
dence or testimony might sometime be required must have 
been anticipated or otherwise the memorandum of the conver­
sation would not have been necessary.
The assumption regarding the name of the threatened 
concern is reinforced by the failure of either of the Con­
gressional investigating committees to ask Gary why he 
failed to give the concern's name to the President. Sig­
nificantly, neither the majority nor minority members of
^The New York Times, November 2$, 191?, p* 11.
?Ibid.
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the Stanley Committee queried Roosevelt on this point 
either.
Perhaps what most clearly indicates the political 
nature of the controversy is the lapse of time between the 
acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. in 1907 and the 
manner in which the controversy became a national politi­
cal issue in the presidential campaign of 1908, resulting 
in a demand for an investigation only in 1909.
Unhappily, the Democrats had been forced to watch 
Roosevelt steal their fire and become the people's popular 
champion against the trusts. Without doubt Roosevelt's 
popularity was an ingredient of the continued Republican 
success at the polls and it was not unnatural for the 
Democrats to look for a chink in the Trust Buster's armor.
The Senate Committee which investigated the ab­
sorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co. completed its work in the 
lame duck session of Congress which began in January and 
ended in March, 1909. Although it called few witnesses, 
the tactics of the Committee's principal Democrat, Senator 
Culberson, in demanding that Roosevelt release information 
not related to the absorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co. from 
the partially completed Bureau of Corporations' investiga­
tion of the steel industry and the President's refusal 
provided the Committee with its only publicity and centered
86
the attention of the investigation on Roosevelt.^
Although the charges that the Democratic members 
made regarding the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. 
were substantially the same as the much better publicized 
Stanley Committee, the publication of these charges co­
incided with the inauguration of a new Administration and 
received little attention. The Stanley Committee, on 
the other hand, from the beginning received a fair share 
of publicity. Credit for this notoriety seems to belong 
to Stanley who had a certain flair for showmanship.
Gates, whose manner of life and reputation assured news­
paper coverage, was called as the first witness and when 
he became irritated at being q*aeried by Stanley about the 
intentions of the U.S. Steel Corporation, the Chairman 
told him that he was only asked these questions because
g
he was the “primusn witness. Nor did Stanley leave the 
propagation of the Committee's activities to the transient 
interest of the newspapers v/ho had Washington correspon­
dents. Each day the Committee heard witnesses, and 10,000
n
copies of the evidence were printed for distribution.
As with many other Congressional investigations,
^Outlook, January 16, 1909, Vol. 91, p* 88.
United States Corporation, p. 16,
^U.S., Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sessM  June 
9, 1911, Congressional Record, pp. 1810, 1811, 1841, 1842.
8?
the purpose of the Stanley Committee was not simply to 
study a change related to a legislative problem. When 
asked on the floor of the House if the Committee hearings 
were some kind of a goad, Stanley described them as an
o
ancillary operation for the Department of Justice.
The bulk of the testimony concerned the acquisition 
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. While the purpose of the Commit­
tee was to determine if the U.S. Steel Corporation or other 
corporations had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the 
attention given to such matters as the founding of the 
corporation in 1901 or the celebrated Gary dinners was 
small in comparison to the detailed probing of the merger 
of the two steel companies.
Stanley took upon himself the main questioning of 
witnesses and set the tone of the investigation. His 
methods stamped him more as a demagogue than as a legis­
lator attempting to use the evidence of witnesses to frame 
more equitable laws. This was evident in the many extrava­
gant and unsubstantiated allegations which were introduced 
as testimony during the hearings and later included in the 
Majority Report as facts, although neither the whole testi­
mony or cross-examination supported the allegations.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this was the
o
U.S., Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sess.,
May 16, 1911, Congressional Record, p. 1231.
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inclusion of only part of Thorne's evidence to support the, 
charge that the Morgan interests had aggravated the Panic. 
Other examples were the charge that the U.S. Steel Corpora­
tion had forced its competitors to shut down several of
their plants, a charge that was in no way substantiated by 
9any evidence. Stanley's characterization of Gates as a
true competitor struggling against the monopolistic power
of the U.S. Steel Corporation^ is at odds with evidence
that Gates was attempting to monopolize the entire iron
and steel production of the Birmingham district.^1
Many of Stanley's statements could only have been
intended for the uninformed. He falsely stated that the
Bureau of Corporations Report on the steel industry had
12said that the U.S. Steel Corporation was a monopoly.
Likewise, he said that the Bureau of Corporations had been
15investigating the same corporation since 1896,  ^although 
the U.S. Steel Corporation did not come into existence
14until 1901 and the Bureau of Corporations only in 190$.
Nevertheless, political considerations forced 
Stanley and others who were criticizing the acquisition to
9 10^Stanley Report— Majority, p. 161. Ibid., p. 204.
^ Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 2$9.
•^Stanley Report— Majority, p. 204. ^ Ibid., p. 204.
■^ "Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and 
Labor, S t atut e s at "h an ge, > ’B27~TT90 JJ.
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exercise a certain circumspection in their attacks.
Birmingham had, greeted the coming of U.S. Steel Corporation
15in 1907 with great enthusiasm v and, while this event did 
not make the city another Pittsburgh or Gary, not only were 
the prospects pleasing but the years between the acquisi­
tion and the time of the Stanley Committee investigation 
had brought advantages and benefits. Workers were paid 
twice a month instead of once a month and the use of prison
1 filabor was discontinued.
The most significant advantage was a change in the 
marketing price structure which substituted the so-called 
Birmingham differential for Pittsburgh Plus prices. Prior 
to the merger the T.C.I. and R. Co. had charged all cus­
tomers the going price at Pittsburgh plus the freight charge 
from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery. Shortly after the 
merger, the U.S. Steel Corporation enhanced the competi­
tive position of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by abandoning Pitts­
burgh plus in favor of charging a flat 3 dollars over the 
Pittsburgh price to the point of delivery. Without doubt, 
this extended the market that Schley said was restricted
^Irmes, Coal and Iron, pp. 519-20.
-1  r
Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation, File 
2612-1-4-2, RG 122.
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by freight rates as high as $4.60 per ton.'*''7
Consequently, Stanley's attack on the merger did
not pass without challenge. Richard Austin, a Tennessee
Congressman, pointed to the large sales that T.C.I. and R.
Co. had made in foreign countries as a result of the U.S.
Steel Corporation's world-wide marketing organization.
Then he noted that Oscar Underwood, the Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, in whose district the
T.C.I. and R. Co. was located, had made no adverse com-
ISments on the merger.
Underwood's silence was more than passive as Stan­
ley later learned. When the Committee's work was done in 
the summer of 1912 and its report published, Stanley wished 
to discuss it on the floor of the House. Underwood used
his position as the Ways and Means Committee Chairman to
19block any discussion. ' An attack in the press on Under­
wood's obstructive tactics allowed Stanley to defend his
fellow congressman from what he termed a misguided inter-
20pretation of Underwood's actions. On the following day,
■^George W. Stocking, Basing Point Pricing and 
Regional Development: A Case Sfrildyo^ Steel
Tndiiitl^ 1 • Unrvers'i’ty oT"TTortli Carolina Press,
lWTj, pp. 63-64, fn 1 (hereafter cited as Stocking,
ISU.S. Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sess., 
May 16, 1911 * Congressional Record, p. 1231.
19Ibid., August 3, 1912, pp. 1014-6, 10160.
20Ibid., August 7, 1912, p. 10306.
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the Stanley Report was debated on the floor of the House 
and the discussion was closed without mention or allu­
sion to the T.C.I. and R. Co. or the merger that occurred 
in 1907.21
The lack of verbal pyrotechnics merely under­
scored the fact that important Congressional interests 
could not afford to be exposed to public interests, and it 
is well worth noting that there were no derogatory remarks 
about this merger on the floor of Congress except for 
Senator Culberson’s remarks in 1909- Likewise, it ac­
counts for the reproduction of 10,000 copies daily of the 
evidence given at the Stanley Hearings, since these copies 
could be kept out of the automatic distribution channels 
that the Congressional Record followed. Above all, it ex­
plains Bryan’s failure to name the company when he opened 
the issue in the presidential campaign of 1908, when he 
repeated it in 1912, and Wilson's failure to make the
material in the Stanley Report an issue in 1912 as the
22press predicted he would. Moreover, Roosevelt's willing­
ness in 1908 to factually amplify on Bryan's obscure alle­
gation probably stemmed from the same motive.
Contemporary press opinion of the Stanley Commit­
tee was unfavorable. Even before the Committee finished
21Ibid., August 8, 1912, pp. 10518-38.
22Bureau of Cornorations Steel Investigation,
Pile 2612-1-4-2, RG’ 122".
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its work, the line that it- had taken on the Panic of 1907 
received skeptical treatment, A few weeks before the 
publication of the Report, the Democratic New York Times 
commented editorially ". . . Chairman Stanley wants some­
thing to influence the election, since he would not pro-
24ceed otherwise if he were not thinking of the election.'
The Report itself was even less favorably viewed.
Although the Minority Report of the Committee was free of
the clumsy political bias of the Majority Report, it did
not fail to make a partisan defense of Roosevelt's actions
in its closing paragraphs. On the othex* hand, it was at
best a weak rebuttal of the charges in the Majority Report.
The press comment was caustic and spared neither side.
Editorially the New York Evening Mail called the Report
25”. . . largely electioneering guesswork,” ^ while the New
York Times said, ”. . .  the Stanley Committee provided a
political jest book which either side will hurl at the
26other through the campaign.“ Summing up the reaction
of the nation's press, the Literary Digest noted that the
Report's publication was viewed as a political rather than
27a legislative event.
^ Independent, August 17, 1911, Vol. 70, pp. 378-79.
^The New York Times, July 17, 1912, p. 6.
25-^Quoted in the Literary Digest, August 3, 1912,
Vol. -45, p. 178.
26Ibid. 27Ibid., p. 176.
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The prediction of The Nexf York Tribune, immediately 
.prior to the publication of the Report, that it would set 
forth the political lines of the Democratic and Republican
OQ
Parties in the forthcoming election, did not hold true.
No evidence can be found that any of the three major 
candidates ever referred to it. More important, the Demo- 
cratic Party for which the Report would have served as a 
source of ammunition had already moved away from the posi­
tion which the Stanley Report made in its legislative 
recommendations.
In 1912 the Democratic Party Platform made no men­
tion of an arbitrary percentage of control that a corpora­
tion could exercise in an industry. The 1908 platform, 
however, had specified the 50 per cent limitation which 
Bryan used in his allegation against Roosevelt in the Presi­
dential election of that year concerning the T.C.I. and R.
29Co. merger. The 30 per cent limitation recommended by
the Democratic majority in the Stanley Report was not in
. . 30consonance with the party position.
Still the Stanley Committee cannot be dismissed as 
having no effect on the events of its time or for that
28Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigations, Pile 
2612-l-4-271^n227'    -~—
29^National Party Platforms, comp, by Kirk H. Porter 
and Donald BruceT’oEnsonX'^rbana, Illinois: University of 
Illinois Press, 1966), p. 149.
^Ibid. , p. 169.
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matter on the course of history. While the Committee was 
in session, the Department of Justice filed its suit 
against the U.S. Steel Corporation for violation of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the connection between the two 
appears more than coincidental.
Like the Congressional investigations of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. acquisition, the equity suit against the
U.S. Steel Corporation was instituted some years after the
acts with which it was charged were committed, with the
exception of the Gary dinners. Even the dinners, which
■31began in November, 1907, ended in January, 1911i five 
months prior to opening of the Stanley Hearings and ten 
months prior to the government’s institution of its suit.
Somewhat paradoxically, the filing of the suit 
came only four months after the issuance of the Bureau of 
Corporations Report on the Steel Industry which said that 
the U.S. Steel Corporation was not a monopoly.
Viewed through the eyes of many contemporaries, 
the government’s decision to prosecute the U.S. Steel 
Corporation and its timing appeared only as an act of 
political expediency.
The New York Press said, "It is impossible for the 
Administration to escape the suspicion of political motives 
since the effect of the suit is taking the wind out of the
31Stocking, Basing Point Pricing, p. 4-6.
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sails of the Democratic House by anticipating the report
52
of its Stanley Committee. The Independent noted
”. . .  that much of the petition was suggested by the
2 2
Stanley Committee." J. G. Butler, an independent iron 
manufacturer and president of the Western Pig Iron Associa­
tion, called the suit an outgrowth of the politically in- 
spired Stanley investigation.
More substantive evidence of the dubious motives 
of the suit revealed itself in the instructions from the 
Department of Justice to its attorneys who were to examine 
the IT.S. Steel Corporation officials to avoid questions 
that would produce evidence regarding the total national 
iron ore resources and the corporation's relative position 
to the total resources.^ Previously this was pointed out 
as a questionable aspect of both the Bureau of Corporations 
Report and the Stanley Report; it is apparent the govern­
ment pressed its case knowing that a major point on which 
it charged the U.S. Steel Corporation with being a monopoly 
in an economic sense contained a flaw which v/ould be best 
concealed from judicial examination.
^'"Quoted in the Literary Digest, November 4, 1911 * 
Vol. 43, p. 777.
^ Independent, November 2, Vol. 71* P- 123.
^The New York Times, November 11, 1911, p. 7- 
55
Bureau of Corpoi'ations Steel Investigation, Pile
6518-8-10, R G T ^ Z T ™
96
Regardless of whether the administration's motives 
•in bringing the suit were political, the results were*
The charge that Gary duped Roosevelt and the ex-president's 
quick defense of his actions and attack on Taft's anti­
trust policies not only brought the long smoldering, semi­
private conflict of the two into the open, but split the 
Republican Party into pro-Taft and pro-Roosevelt factions*
Although Taft denied knowing that Roosevelt's name was to
36be included in the government’s petition, efforts at re­
conciliation between them foundered on Roosevelt's unabated 
rage at being named as the gullible victim of Gary’s 
deceit.^
Without doubt, Roosevelt's implacability served his 
own political ambitions well and Taft realized how we11 
they served him* On January 15* 1912, when the President's 
military aide, Major Butt, who was on friendly terms with 
Roosevelt, told Taft that the breach with the ex-president 
was irreparable, the President grimly replied that he might 
be defeated for re-election but that he would defeat
Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, the Intimate 
Letters of Archie Butt ,“l^Trtar^ATd^7^ ^ n  IT'TGarden 
UTty7~TCwra*ToHcT'TJ6uBIeday, I)oran and Company, Inc., 1950), 
p. 813 (hereafter cited as Butt, Taft and R oosevelt);
Henry P. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 
Vol. II (Hamden, ConnecT£cu35T‘^ ^hBn^TC6¥s7^T9^77 
(hereafter cited as Pringle, Taft).
^Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, p. 811.
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38Roosevelt in the Convention.
What little evidence there is points to George 
Wickersham, the Attorney-General, as the person responsi­
ble for the political ineptitude of bringing Roosevelt's 
name into the suit. Butt said that the ex-president v/as 
named ". . . thanks to that marplot Wickersham. Other
evidence of Wickersham's lack of political sophistication 
exists. Two days after the suit against the U.S. Steel 
Corporation was filed, the Omaha World-Herald quoted its 
Washington correspondent as saying that Mr. Wickersham 
gave much of the credit for the suit to the Stanley Com­
mittee.^
If Wickersham did give credit to the Stanley Com­
mittee for inspiring the suit against the U.S. Steel Cor­
poration or if the suit with its implied aspersion on 
Roosevelt's gullibility was a reaction to the Stanley 
Hearings, then Stanley must be given credit not only in 
conducting successful ancillary operation for the Justice 
Department but also indirectly bringing about the open 
breach between Roosevelt and Taft and the consequent 
Republican defeat in 1912.
In the controversy over the acquisition of the 
T.C.I. and R. Co., a point generally overlooked was that
58Ibid. , p. 813. ?9Ibid., p. 811.
^Ornaha World-Herald, October 29, 1911, P- 1.
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Roosevelt's acquiescence to this merger set a precedent. 
Prior to this time, neither business nor the government 
discussed proposed mergers or the legality of mergers al­
ready in existence in relation to the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act* Consequently, considerable uncertainty always ex­
isted about the legal status of a combination or a pro­
posed merger.
Despite the published acquiescence of Roosevelt to 
the merger of the two steel producers, there is no evi­
dence of other companies attempting to preclude legal 
action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by reconciling 
their problems with the executive branch during the re­
maining sixteen months of the Roosevelt Administration* 
Under Taft such reconciliations were impossible, since he 
believed that anyone could understand the anti-trust
statute and was impatient with those who said they could 
41not. An almost immediate change took place under the 
next Administration. Although Wilson, like Roosevelt, had 
been loud in his attacks on the trusts, his Attorney- 
General, James NcReynolds, began negotiations with the New* 
Haven Railroad and the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company which resulted in these companies agreeing to 
surrender part of their recently acquired control of the
41Pringle, Taft, p. 655 > quoting letter from Taft 
to H. L. HigginsonT^Beptember 8, 1911.
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control of the New England transportation system and the
national telephone network respectively in exchange for
the government1s dropping all charges against them under
42the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
At the same time, an attempt to legislate authori-
43zation for such agreements was voted down in Congress. ^
However, the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.S.
Steel Corporation suit sanctioned Roosevelt’s action in
44the T.C.I. and R. Co* merger. When in 1925 the Depart­
ment of Justice inaugurated the policy which is still in
effect of approving or disapproving of mergers before they
45are consummated, it caused no controversy indicating that 
the question of the President’s propriety in doing this had 
passed as a political issue.^
In retrospect, the controversy over the T.C.I. and
42New York Times, December 20, 1913, p. 1; August 
12, 1914, p. 9; October 18, 1914, Part III, p. 1.
^ J o h n  D. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy (Balti­
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1*951), p7~T76 (Hereafter 
cited as Clark, Trust Policy).
^United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 
251 U.S. 446, 447 (1919).
^Clark, Trust Policy, p. 256; Earl V. Kintner, An 
Antitrust Primer, A Guide to Antitrust and Trade_Re^Ri§;"' 
tion Laws for ~lBusine~s¥mHn^rNevrHHrHT~iHeHHITmri 1 an 
Uoipen^ T^^ S^ rjT^ p. X397
^Clark, Trust Policy, p. 256.
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R. Co. was in reality a partisan political issue of the 
times rather than an event of significant and continuing 
economic importance. The preservation of the legend 
merely illustrates the propensity of some writers and 
historians to make the past serve the political causes 
and passions of their own era.
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